



## Addressing the Paris Declaration

### Collective Responsibility for Capacity Development

#### What works and what doesn't?

3 to 5 October 2006, Nairobi, Kenya

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## FOREWORD

“The day will come when African countries do not need any ODA from developed countries. They will stand by themselves without donors” – so an African participant at the international LenCD forum. But how to achieve this?



Capacity development is increasingly seen as a key driver for effective development and therefore a key objective of effective aid. This consensus is clearly articulated in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of March 2005. Regardless how much funding and external support is given, development efforts will invariably fail without enhanced country capacity at both, national and local level. By now, it is widely acknowledged that the process of developing capacity must originate from within. In this process, as stated in the *Good Practice Paper* ‘The challenge of Capacity Development’ of the OECD/DAC, the partner countries should lead whereas donors play a supporting role. But how to do this?

To meet these challenges and to better understand what works and what doesn’t, the Learning Network on Capacity Development held its 2006 Forum in Nairobi. During the three day conference at the African Institute of Capacity Development, 117 participants from more than 30 different countries thoroughly discussed how to address the Paris Declaration and explored the opportunities and challenges with regard to Capacity Development.

The conference was a success in two ways. Firstly, the results from the various working groups and discussions documented in this paper, demonstrate how multifaceted and intensive the participants approached the issues and exchanged their views and experiences. Secondly, the members of LenCD have decided to establish a permanent LenCD secretariat. The reason being the success of the forum, the current and future challenges around Capacity Development, and the role and importance of this valuable network itself. In future LenCD will place increased emphasis on facilitating between donors and partners and their increased active participation in the network.

Now, let me take the opportunity to thank everyone who has contributed to the success of the conference, namely the participants, the LenCD members and particularly JICA, OECD / DAC, UNDP and AICAD.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


This 2006 International Forum (3 to 5 October, in Nairobi) was organised by LenCD in order to identify suitable approaches and experiences in response to the challenge of 'developing capacity from within' as called for in the Paris Declaration. Taking the declaration as a point of departure, the forum addressed three main questions: 1. How to support Capacity Development through joint approaches? 2. How to assess progress in Capacity and Capacity Development? And 3. How to strengthen Capacity Development through mutual and domestic accountability?

Each of the three sub-topics began with a plenary introduction, followed by parallel working group sessions with two presentations per working group. Discussions in the working groups were structured around four to six 'guiding questions'. The overall findings were supplemented by open space sessions.

### **How to support capacity development through joint approaches?**

National capacity development policies are important instruments. They ensure that different CD efforts can be coordinated and that complementarities and synergies can be tapped. In addition, they provide powerful tools to the government in the process of donor coordination. Macro-level CD strategies can effectively address issues that are part of the enabling environment of capacity. Pillars of such an enabling environment include freedom of the press, access to information, rule of law, human rights, security of people and property, civil service conditions, access to higher education, electronic communication etc. A national strategy that aims to ensure that these pillars are in place and functioning provides a vital and fertile foundation for any subsequent CD efforts.

However, whereas an overarching policy has proven to be a force for good; overarching and all-encompassing CD programmes have had such disappointing and at times destructive effects, that it is generally agreed that these should be avoided. Instead, CD programmes should be formulated at a level where a coherent set of activities around a series of common objectives can be identified. Sometimes, this may be at a sector level (e.g. health, education, transport) sometimes at a cross-sectoral level (e.g. rural development) or at a sub-sectoral level (e.g. micro-finance, public finance management, business promotion). Wherever possible, CD efforts should be mainstreamed into existing development programmes. First because it gives CD itself a clearer focus and second because for (sector) programmes to succeed CD has to be an integral element of their design and implementation.



Both CD policies at macro level and the detailed CD programmes at implementation levels should take account of the role and capacity needs of non-state actors. Consumers have to be able to demand services, the private sector has to generate growth to raise domestic revenue and civil society has to hold government accountable. Government is only one player in the system and too much of a focus on the state at the cost of non-state actors leads to a lopsided development process or none at all.


The choice of modalities with which to support CD should be based on a common framework of objectives developed by the partner and donors together. Different modalities, including TA pooling, budget support or project modalities, can be applied within this framework in such a way that the available TC across donors is balanced over CD needs within and across sectors and between levels of government and non-government actors. Experience has shown that all modalities permit better alignment, provided that a harmonisation tool such as a common framework of objectives exists.

However, two things seem to be needed: First, there has to be more clarity on how to apply different modalities such that they contribute to building the capacity of local systems. The discussion should be less about “which modality is better” but rather on “what are the implications of adhering to the principles of effective aid for each modality?” Discussions during the forum clearly showed that there is a role and place for each modality, provided it is applied in the right way. Second; this better understanding of what it means to support ‘the bigger picture’ should then lead to an approach where situation specific comparative advantages of different modalities are carefully considered. The mix of modalities used, would then depend on a demand driven process, rather than be led by donor procedures or donor preferences.

This would also be in the spirit of the Paris Declaration, which recognises the key importance of countries taking the lead in their own capacity development processes. However, some concern was felt that the way this is measured allows for short-cuts to be made: The proportion of donor CD support that is channelled through national and coordinated programme is important; but it does not automatically imply that the CD process is owned and led by the partner. Therefore a too narrow interpretation of this indicator could compromise due attention to strengthening leadership, ownership and responsibility on the side of the partner.

### **How to assess progress in capacity and capacity development?**

The importance of the ‘soft side’ of capacity is increasingly realised but this does not mean that we are therefore better able to deal with it. Issues like ownership, leadership, legitimacy, credibility, confidence, trust and creativity are essential qualities towards development, both from the perspective of the donors as well as the recipients. But these qualities are difficult to measure and monitor. Methods that are helpful tend to be of the sort in which a wide



spectrum of largely qualitative information is absorbed and digested in an informal way. Getting this right depends on the personality of the 'monitor' and requires a fair amount of interpersonal and diplomatic skills.

Ironically, in the current programme era of demand-led development, there is an increased need for informal approaches and interpersonal skills; yet, there appears to be less of them around: High rates of donor staff turnover and the withdrawal of donor representatives from implementation levels (to reside in capitals) make that a lot of that 'finger on the pulse' is lost.


In addition to a lack of skills to monitor 'the soft side', donor-led monitoring may also be determined by the kind of CD support that is available. Where CD is supply driven, donor monitoring of capacity tends to focus on the things that money can buy (and buy quickly) such as training, research and consultants. Even if the soft side of capacity and CD needs was captured effectively, the question remains whether donors would be able to address that part. With the awareness growing on the critical role of things like trust, credibility and legitimacy, there appears to be need for more information on how these can be fostered.

In general, monitoring and evaluation serves two main purposes; that of accountability and that of learning. The monitoring for 'learning' that is less about measuring progress but more about learning lessons shows a lot of promise and is appreciated by donors and partners alike.

Learning and accountability need not always be kept separate. In some cases systems that were set up for accountability purposes simply added in value when they were opened up to more learning based approaches and indicators. However, encouraging as this may be, there is an important exception to be made: Where performance monitoring indicators are simultaneously used as 'triggers' for aid disbursement this does not allow for a honest analysis of results and a dialogue aimed at learning lessons. In such cases, the strands of dialogue/learning and conditionality/accountability should be kept separate.

Capacity should be monitored carefully at the start of any programme of development. This should be done jointly with the partner and provide a baseline not only for future progress monitoring, but also for programme design itself. Every effort should be made to not design overambitious programmes, but to instead use the available capacity plus an estimation of a feasible CD impact as a tool to delineate the possible scope of the programme. It is better to have an incremental but feasible strategy than pursue a big leap, big disappointment trajectory.

Capacity development should be made central to the Paris Declaration, more so than it is at present, if its aim of effective aid is to be met. Whereas the declaration acknowledges that capacity is the key to making aid more effective and achieving the MDGs, its targets and indicators offer too much opportunity



for short-cuts. Less important than whether national strategies are there, is whether these are owned; less important than money being channelled through the treasury is that local systems and procedures are strengthened by doing so.


**How to strengthen capacity development through mutual and domestic accountability?**

Commitments towards mutual accountability between donors and partner countries have to take account of an uneven playing field. Whereas donors can use conditionality to hold partners accountable; partners have no such stick-and-carrot instrument. Donor accountability towards its partners has to come out of commitments at international level; country level agreements like Memoranda of Understanding; peer-pressure at international and national fora as well as donors own discipline.

To foster mutual accountability at country levels, it is important that partners (are supported to) lead CD processes in their country. Good practice suggests that where possible these should be based on common frameworks of objectives; be linked to national development strategies; have a jointly designed M&E framework as the basis for independent monitoring; and have a clear exit strategy. Mutual accountability from the donor to the recipient within such a CD process is especially desirable in the areas of (i) aid predictability and (ii) the use of technical assistance. With respect to aid predictability it is suggested that information on donor performance be assessed internationally, be made transparent and widely available, possibly together with a 'ranking' of donors by the recipient.

With respect to the use of TA, it is suggested that a conceptual framework for the use of TA in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda is developed. This has to start from a systematic approach to assessing the context for the whole package of CD options, one of which is TA. Where it is decided that TA is required, careful consideration should be given to the type, mix (international and local) and role of consultants that is needed. A much more market oriented approach to TA is needed, whereby it is untied from donor suppliers but sourced directly by partner countries. This requires that donors see TA less as a 'donor instrument' and more as a 'good' that partners can source directly through a well-functioning market.

In the interest of domestic accountability it is important that donors balance their support to expenditure with support to domestic revenue mobilisation. The importance of this is underlined by the finding that aid dependence is positively related with accountability to donors and negatively related with accountability to local constituencies. Therefore, if donors don't want to be part of the problem, they have to take account of their own impact in the domestic accountability equation.



Paying attention to domestic revenue should also include the role played by local government. Not only is a significant proportion of domestic revenue collected at that level (and not always accounted for) but local authorities have an important responsibility towards local development and are accountable to local constituencies. Other promising avenues towards supporting domestic accountability include: support to parliament, the mass media, strengthening the linkage between sector and central ministries, and assessing the scope of public private partnerships.

The foundation for mutual accountability that is anchored in domestic accountability has to be built on ownership of the development programme by the partner. Where governments don't own the strategy, they will not feel responsible (or accountable) for it. A cornerstone in the accountability-foundation on the side of the donor is the flexibility and autonomy to respond to the country-context. Where donor representatives are pushed more by their head-offices than they are pulled by the partner institutions they are meant to support, then accountability lines upwards will always dominate those downward and much of the scope for trust and mutual accountability is lost.

#### **The Paris Declaration as an instrument towards capacity development**

An overarching aim of the forum was to look at capacity development as pursued under the Paris Declaration. In particular, the commitments towards the objectives (i) partner countries strengthen development capacity with support from donors (§ 23 and 24) and (ii) mutual accountability (§ 47 to 50) were addressed during the discussions. The indicators associated with these objectives are respectively: percentage of donor capacity development support provided through co-ordinated programmes consistent with partners' national development strategies (nr 4) and number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness including those in this Declaration (nr 12).

Although there was agreement with the declaration's ambition that partner countries take the lead in their own capacity development processes, the way this is pursued drew out some recommendations:

Capacity development should be made more central to the Paris Declaration. This has implications especially for the indicators: Whereas the commitments emphasise capacity and ownership, the targets do not capture these intentions with their current focus on quantifiable inputs such as percentage of funds; number of countries, percentage of missions etc. Instead, indicators would need to be formulated such that they also measure issues like ownership of national strategies and monitoring instruments (not just their existence) and strengthening local systems (not just using them);

Although it is understood that a global monitoring instrument needs to rely on proxies, more effort should be spend to define and qualify these. In particular,



the use of 'performance' as a proxy for 'capacity' is inaccurate and the use of 'mutual performance assessments' as a proxy for 'mutual accountability' is insufficient.



Indicators need to be formulated to measure domestic accountability to ensure that commitments towards issues like parliamentary oversight and participatory processes are met.



Throughout the declaration there is too great a focus on donors and recipient government. The pursuit of effective aid and development requires that the role of non-state actors (private sector, civil society, NGOs) should be taken into account and addressed.





## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AICAD	African Institute for Capacity Development
CD	Capacity Development
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
eVal	Computer-based evaluation programme
GovNet	DAC Network on Governance and Capacity Development
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IT	Information Technology
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LenCD	Learning Network on Capacity Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic and Development Cooperation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TC	Technical Cooperation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



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## INTRODUCTION

The Learning Network on Capacity Development (LenCD) was set up in 2004 as an informal platform that links together analysts from bilateral and multilateral, governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organisations engaged in development cooperation. Besides its ambition to exchange experience and ideas on CD and to further promote effective approaches to CD it has been the aim of the network to provide greater form and visibility to capacity development, both as part of the work of the DAC Network on Governance (GovNet) and beyond.

This 2006 International Forum (3 to 5 October, in Nairobi) which was organised by LenCD with strong support of GTZ, OECD/DAC, JICA, UNDP, the African Institute of Capacity Development, and various network members, has been started in order to identify suitable approaches and experiences in response to the challenge of ‘developing capacity from within’ as called for in the Paris Declaration. Building up on the DAC guidance paper *the Challenge of Capacity Development: Working towards Good Practice* and taking the Paris Declaration as a point of departure, the addressed three main questions:

1. How to support Capacity Development through joint approaches?
2. How to assess progress in Capacity and Capacity Development?
3. How to strengthen Capacity Development through mutual and domestic accountability?

Each of the three sub-topics began with a plenary introduction, followed by parallel working group sessions with two presentations per working group. Discussions in the working groups were structured around four to six ‘guiding questions’. The overall findings were supplemented by open space sessions. The forum programme is attached as annex 1.

By bringing together practitioners and relevant experience, the forum highlighted insights and lessons, facilitated networking among participants and broadened LenCD’s constituency and partnerships especially with respect to southern partners.

In total 118 people participated, from nearly 30 different countries, representing a wide array of bilateral and multilateral organisations, governments, NGOs, civil society and private sector (see annex 2).

This report is based on the three main topics of the forum. Within each topic, findings are summarised not per working group but per guiding question, bringing together information from plenary presentations, work group presentations and discussions and open space sessions. Wherever relevant, reference is made to particular country experience, whether from working group presentations or from experience related by participants to the working group. A list of resource documents is attached as annex 3.



## HOW TO SUPPORT CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH JOINT APPROACHES?

*“Ownership, the cornerstone of aid and development effectiveness, is itself premised on the capacity to exercise it”<sup>1</sup>*

The Paris Declaration puts the responsibility for capacity development firmly in the hands of the partner countries, with donors playing a supportive role. To fulfil this supportive role, donors are expected to align and harmonise their support along country capacity development needs and in the context of national strategic frameworks.

This point was made clear by E. Westreicher, the chairman of the OECD-DAC GovNet. In his introductory speech he emphasised that CD efforts should be build upon country-led (as opposed to donor-driven) objectives. He went a step further by saying that this implies that the outcomes of CD efforts would need to be monitored from the perspective of the beneficiaries. A sub-group of these beneficiaries are women and Westreicher reminded the forum that CD efforts have hitherto insufficiently addressed gender. He concluded his speech by expressing the hope that with the current emphasis on effective aid, capacity development efforts can be better tailored to the situation on the ground so that some of the disappointing results of the last 40 years can be put right.

Presentations and discussions under this first topic of the forum focussed on Paris Declaration statements 23 and 24 and on indicator number 4 *Strengthen capacity by coordinated support* (box 1). The objective of this session was two-fold (i) to identify emerging lessons in promoting joint approaches to CD and (ii) that these lessons can inform a constituency of government, civil society and development partners in their pursuit of the Paris Declaration in this area.

### **Box 1: Paris Declaration – Partner countries strengthen development capacity with support from donors**

23 **Partner countries** commit to integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national development strategies and pursue their implementation through country-led capacity development strategies where needed.

24 **Donors** commit to align their analytic and financial support with partners' capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development accordingly (indicator 4).

Indicator 4: **Strengthen capacity by coordinated support**: Percent of donor capacity development support provided through co-ordinated programmes consistent with partners' national development strategies.

<sup>1</sup> Samuel Wangwe in *Capacity Development for Mutual and Domestic Accountability*

Indicator 4 target for 2010: 50% of technical cooperation flows are implemented through co-ordinated programmes consistent with national development strategies.

Baseline for 2005: 27% (based on a questionnaire of 33 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America)

Assessment criteria: Volume of technical cooperation provided through coordinated programmes in support of CD divided by the total volume of aid provided at country level.

A total of eight presentations were held in four working groups covering a range of CD modalities from project support via harmonised support to support that is fully aligned within national strategic frameworks (table 1).

<b>Table 1: Presentations on How to support capacity development through joint approaches?</b>	
WG 1 Towards joint approaches to capacity development in SWAp: Learning locally or scaling up?	
Self-reliant Capacity Development for District Health Managers: Harmonization of Technical Assistance and SWAp, A case of Morogoro Health Project, <i>Tanzania</i>	Dr Mtey, Morogoro Municipal Council, Tanzania; Ms Fukushi, JICA
<i>Mozambique's</i> emerging programme for decentralised planning and finance	Norbert Eulerling, GTZ
WG 2 Getting to joint approaches to capacity development – and filling the gaps meanwhile?	
Complementary Approach for Capacity Development in <i>Kenya</i> (Secondary Education);	Dr Karega Mutahi, Ministry of Education, Kenya; T Sugiyama, JICA
Joint Approaches to CD in Education in <i>Cambodia</i>	H.E. Pok Than, Secretary of State, Ministry of Education, Cambodia; Mike Ratcliffe
WG 3 How to design CD as part of wider support – and can joint assessment frameworks foster CD?	
Design of Capacity Development in the World Bank's 2006 portfolio	Mark Nelson, the World Bank Institute
Towards assessing country capacity to manage for development results (MfDR)	Charles Clift, OECD-DAC Secretariat

**Table 1: Presentations on How to support capacity development through joint approaches?**

WG 4 Pursuing Joint Approaches to CD at the National Level	
Joint Approaches to CD; lessons learnt and ways forward in <i>Ghana</i>	Helen Allotey, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; Kristian Lempa, GTZ
Moving towards a new aid architecture for delivering Technical Cooperation in <i>Mozambique</i>	Alfredo Manzive, consultant Mozambique, Simon van den Broeke, DFID

Discussions in the working groups offered further country or case study insights and all this experience put together yielded some clear guides towards joint CD approaches. The findings are analysed according to the six cross-cutting issues identified for this session, namely:

1. What could national CD objectives and strategies entail?
2. Mainstreaming CD and/or separate CD streams of work?
3. Aligning and harmonising objectives and CD results
4. Alignment and harmonisation in the programme cycle
5. Alignment and harmonisation across different aid modalities
6. How to measure progress on “indicator 4”?


**What could national capacity development objectives and strategies entail?**

*Is CD best served by overarching objectives, strategies and cross-cutting programmes, or by a sector- or institution-focus? Or which combination of both?*

The experience with nation-wide all encompassing cross-cutting CD programmes is so disappointing that participants talked of ‘illusionary master-plans’ or ‘monster programmes’ and there was general consensus that overarching nation-wide CD programmes should be avoided. Experiences from Ethiopia, Tanzania and Rwanda point at the following problems:

- i It is difficult to balance decentralised CD processes with an increase in power at the top; nationwide programmes have a ‘(re)centralising’ tendency and may undermine ongoing decentralisation efforts.
- ii There is a significant risk of political manipulation of (public sector) reform processes by ‘super ministries’ of Capacity Development.
- iii All encompassing programmes suffer from unclear ownership; they often involve blurred mandates and lines of communication.




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- iv Harmonisation of implementation across different programme-components is near impossible.
  - v There is a risk that donors 'pick and choose' programme elements rather than buying into the whole agenda (thus hindering synchronised implementation across programme components).

Whereas overarching programmes may be a bad idea, a national CD policy has proven useful in providing guidance and focus. Such a policy needs not be implemented through a single programme. In fact implementation through a series of complementary, but separate programmes (or programme components) appears promising: Mozambique is in the process of formulating a CD strategy that offers guidelines and principles to act as a framework for CD activities throughout the country. In Kenya, the Paris Declaration 'partnership principles' were translated into a country level Memorandum of Understanding that has helped the effectiveness of CD activities in the Education Sector. A general lesson seems to be that CD policy-frameworks should offer sufficient guidance to help ensure that activities are 'policy compliant' but at the same time they need to allow enough flexibility to tailor activities to suit sector or local needs.

Macro-level CD policies can address the overall enabling environment of capacity development. At that macro-level, the 'pillars' of capacity need to be understood and priorities set. Examples of pillars of an enabling environment are: freedom of the press; access to information; transparency of information; rule of law; human rights; security of people and property; research infrastructure; civil service conditions; access to higher education; electronic communication. Two components of this enabling environment received a lot of attention:

- i In addressing the enabling environment, whether at the macro- or the sector level, the issue of capacity retention should receive priority. Considerable frustration was voiced, especially by participants from partner countries, about the fact that capacity built is often capacity lost. Or in the words of a participant from Lesotho: "What good does capacity development do, if we loose every second nurse trained, either to the UK or to South Africa?"
- ii Another key element of the enabling environment is the legislative framework. Several country cases reported experiences where legal instruments acted as triggers of effective CD. In Ghana, the Public Procurement Act provided the kick-start to the strengthening of the national procurement system. In Uganda, the Transformation Steering Committee formulated a law which led to the coordination of interventions in the financial sector.

Whereas overarching policies or concerns may be addressed at the macro-level, participants generally agreed that the actual CD programmes are better formulated at sector level than at macro-level. Experience has taught that it is




much easier to reach a consensus at sector level. Also, at the sector level, stakeholders can be mobilised around tangible and practical issues more easily. Finally, at the sector level, responsibility and ownership are more straightforward.

It has long been recognised that high level leadership and commitment, both from central and sector ministries, is essential to successful programme implementation. For CD interventions, this has two main consequences: (i) As capacity development itself is a process of empowerment, it is all the more important that it is endorsed, even encouraged from the top thus high-level-support to CD is an absolute pre-requisite, and (ii) leadership training should be part of CD processes. In the absence of this, the empowerment from below as a consequence of successful CD programmes may be perceived as a threat amongst higher levels. Several examples were given of cases where trained individuals at grassroots levels were transferred to other regions to prevent them from actually using their capacity, in this case the capacity for mobilising local development (Zambia Local Government; Malawi Local Government).

A related issue is the precarious balance between capacity and ownership. For both macro and sector level programmes it was reported that although CD strategies ideally need to be managed by the partner, often the capacity to manage such strategies is lacking. This evokes a bit of a 'chicken and egg' situation, according to some participants who wondered "how do we ensure ownership when capacity is lacking and how do we build capacity when ownership is lacking?" A possible way forward is to adopt an incremental approach, by starting small and compromising local ownership to some extent, but then to gradually move to increasingly owned, aligned and harmonised programmes as confidence and capacity grows.

There is a genuine and justified concern about the fact that non-state actors are overlooked in the new aid effectiveness agenda as captured in the Paris Declaration. Nevertheless, non-state actors are of critical importance to CD processes: either as the ultimate beneficiary of CD in government or as a target group of CD programmes themselves. Thus, as was often pointed out: CD strategies should include non-state actors as well as support to government. At best, a commitment to non-state actors in macro-level CD strategies (where these exist) can act as a basis for support under sector strategies. A good example was the Local Government Programme in Uganda, where 20% of programme funds went to local communities and local service providers with the result that both service quality and service delivery increased. An example of 'bad practice' was reported from the Bangladesh Health Sector where donors had, through their support, created a government that has the power to effectively nullify programmes in support of non-state actors at will.

A further promising component of CD strategies is the element of competition as an internal motivation to capacity development. Local Governments in Uganda rated their own performance and publication of these results stimulated



competition and created a lot of CD momentum. A similar case was reported from Manila, Philippines.

### **Mainstreaming capacity development and/or separate CD streams of work?**


*The Paris Declaration insists that CD should be visible; but does this entail visibility fully integrated in main programmes? Or will CD 'drown' here as short term service delivery targets are favoured over long term CD efforts? Alternatively, is CD better promoted separately? Or does this reduce it to endless CD processes de-linked from service delivery? How can mainstreaming of and focus on CD be balanced?*

The discussion on 'mainstreaming: yes or no' was guided not so much by the need for visible CD but rather by the need for effective CD. Proposals on making CD more effective included the following:

Overall, there appears to be a preference for mainstreaming capacity development into development programmes, be they sector wide approaches, decentralisation programmes or public sector reform processes. This was considered a win-win option for two reasons: (i) it gives the CD efforts themselves a clearer focus and (ii) for (sector) programmes to succeed, CD has to be an integral element of their design and implementation. Separate strands of CD were feared to be insufficiently informed by context or purpose (i.e. 'capacity for what?'), which would harbour the risk of developing capacity that is either not useful or unused.

A second main recommendation was that (mainstreamed or not) the capacity development approach itself should become much more inclusive. It should adopt a systems perspective, it should more effectively link the individual to the institutional context and it should strengthen not only technical but also management and financial skills.

A lot of discussion was spent on the two intertwined, but still largely separate, constructs of *capacity and governance*. Two opposing schools of thought emerged: Those who advocated that governance should be left to the 'good governance' experts and that CD experts should stick to other issues and those who favoured a merger (or at least a much closer cooperation) between capacity and governance. Proponents of the latter were supported by a World Bank presentation which explained that, in the World Bank, CD and governance departments are now joined; a process that initially raised scepticism, but was later found to have yielded a much better dynamic. This led to the general recommendation that (donor) agencies should bring governance and CD teams together, at least in order to better understand how governance type issues and more technical type capacity interface.



The temptation to focus on short term delivery targets instead of the longer term capacity processes is indeed a reality. However, participants pointed out that this is the case not only in donor agencies, but also at the level of the partner country itself. A fundamental mind-shift is needed, both at agency and country level, which allows practitioners pursue long-term capacity goals. This has repercussions at all stages of the programme cycle, but especially at design and evaluation level:

- i At programme design level, the (often long and complicated) process of ensuring ownership should receive precedence over issues such as getting the programme document out on time. Many of the failed CD experiences that were reported, could be traced back to lack of ownership, starting right at the programme design stage (where donor deadlines sometimes cause ownership short-cuts being made).
- ii At the evaluation stage, indicators for issues like country ownership, leadership and governance should be assessed and where possible, rewarded. Currently there is a bias towards public finance and service delivery indicators as these are often ‘triggers’ for aid disbursement.

Widespread consensus existed over the need for CD as a continuous process through ‘learning by doing’ with a gradual shift to ‘learning organisations’, holistic approaches and long-term horizons.


Interestingly, however, the currently favoured motto of ‘TA as a catalyst’ seemed to sit askance in this context. Especially to partner country representatives, the notion of TA as catalysts suggested short-term change, lack of commitment and an avoidance of responsibility.

### **Aligning and harmonising objectives and capacity development results**

*Alignment can take place around each element of the chain; from inputs to CD to results (e.g. enhanced capacity and organisational output) and wider outcomes. Are there lessons emerging showing that: ‘starting with objectives and outputs ‘from the top’ is more feasible than trying to pool TA ‘from the bottom’?*

Experiences and discussions clearly advocate to start with a common framework of objectives from the top and only then adapt the means of aid delivery towards achieving these objectives (one of which may be pooled TA). The tone of the discussion was that doing it the other way around, is like putting the cart before the horse: In the words of a Ugandan participant “first, you have to know where you are going. Only then can you figure out how to get there!”

Just how important such a framework is, was illustrated by a host of examples with participants explaining how efforts towards joint approaches had been ineffective, up until the joint development of a common set of objectives: In



Cambodia Education, joint approaches were constrained by a lack of ‘buy-in’ to a common CD vision. Only after government and donors developed a policy matrix with CD objectives (in 2000), did joint approaches become effective. Similar experiences were made in Mozambique Local Government, where fragmented project support continued to co-exist until a common framework of objectives was developed, after which projects could be ‘joined up’. From Ghana it was reported that the complicated process of TA pooling had been much facilitated by it being pooled around a concrete issue with clear output-objectives, in this case Public Procurement. Also, developing a common vision for CD appeared critical to the successful decentralisation of local government in Uganda.


Having established that a common set of objectives is a pre-requisite, several recommendations were made on how this should be developed:

- i Most important is that CD frameworks should be developed jointly; as leadership and ownership on the side of the partner increase the chance that CD efforts will succeed.
- ii CD frameworks should be output and outcome oriented by setting and monitoring institutional and organisational development targets.
- iii Where possible, they should be part of broader sector reform processes. Good experiences in this regard were reported from the education sector (Kenya and Cambodia) where an inclusive SWAp process really helped accelerate capacity development by focussing on incremental institutional and service delivery targets, with training needs carried out jointly with government to serve as a basis for CD efforts.

However, jointly developed CD frameworks, as described above, take long to develop and programme design stages have to take this into account: Sufficient time should be taken to secure full understanding and commitment to CD reforms and related change management processes. Experiences from Cambodia, Kenya and Mozambique show clearly that CD in a hurry is a non-starter.

The question on TA pooling as one element of joint approaches caused a lot of discussion. A major World Bank stocktaking exercise of 217 investment lending initiatives showed that whereas 46% of projects reported joint financing arrangements with other donors, evidence of a broader coordination was often missing. In general, people felt that TA tends to be the last bastion of donor control in the shift towards country ownership. One reason is that TA is still used in a watchdog role and participants agreed that donors should stop using TA as a means to ensure effective spending of their FA but should instead take a broader sector/country perspective of matching CD support to CD needs.

The World Bank is not the only donor admitting that there is still a major transition to be made from CD for project implementation to a more holistic



approach to CD. But, unless donors manage to do this, the current situation of imbalances at the level of TC within and across sectors will persist. A possible road-map towards an aid delivery that more effectively matches TC supply and demand was offered by Mozambique:

- i “Where SWApS exist, TC should be integrated in the sector plans and budgets, rather than be set up in separate projects, so that a single financing source can be used to prioritise TC activities among other activities;
- ii Where no SWAp exists (or where the existing SWAp is considered inappropriate) TC should increasingly be coordinated and TC funding should be pooled, ensuring a single financing source that can strategically be used to prioritise CD in accordance with sector capacity development objectives”


However, to effectively distribute TC across capacity development needs, requires more than a common framework of objectives. There has to be a critical mass of willing partners, both at the government and at the donor side, to come to a true alignment that has momentum and that is an effective means towards balancing available CD support with existing CD needs.

### **Alignment and harmonising in the programme cycle**

*Capacity development is an ongoing process, rather than a time-bound project or programme. However, there are phases of more intense assessment, of design, implementation, review etc. Are lessons emerging about promising practices of alignment and harmonisation to such particular phases? For example, the Paris Declaration asks for “integrate diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks within country-led strategies for capacity development”*

Alignment is important at all stages of the programme cycle, but joint government-donor training needs assessments are essential at the design stage as was shown by Kenya’s Education Sector Support Programme. At the monitoring stage, the Cambodia Education Programme learned that it is important that a joint monitoring of capacity development progress is an integral part of sector performance evaluation. In Mozambique’s emerging programme for decentralised planning and finance an important lesson was that common approaches for planning, budgeting, procurement and monitoring are essential to ensure that the same learning is done throughout the system.

General recommendations regarding the programme cycle included the warning (from Mozambique) that too much attention is devoted to the planning stage. Instead practitioners are urged to get things moving, to expect mistakes but to ensure that systems are created or supported to learn from such mistakes; in short to accept that practice precedes policy. With respect to capacity



development in the programme cycle a crucial lesson (from Cambodia) is to avoid a CD overload at the start of the programme, but to instead phase and sequence CD activities so that incremental 'learning by doing' can take place and that what has been learned is consolidated through using capacities in between CD phases.


### **Alignment and harmonisation across different aid modalities**

*Development agencies are adopting different modalities of aid delivery. TA, for example, is employed in different ways, in many cases managed by agencies. Are there ways to exploit the advantages of different modalities? How can harmonisation move forward across different modalities?*

In the current debate on aid effectiveness, the continued use of the project modality as well as TA attract most criticism, based on assumptions of lesser government ownership or a more complicated alignment of such modalities. Country experiences showed that more important than the modality itself, is the way in which it is used. In fact, partner country representatives claimed that the ideal sector-support-package is one that consists of different modalities, all used to optimum advantage. What this means was discussed in some detail with respect to the project and to TA.

Of key importance is that projects have to be integrated into national planning processes right from the start. It has to be a case of selecting the 'project modality' tool from the programme toolbox as a 'best-fit' in certain cases. Projects are no longer the default modality they once were and so their use has to be justified on a case by case basis. Furthermore, it should be realised that a project in support of a national (or sector) strategy is markedly different from a classic stand-alone project. Its characteristics have to include:

- i Where the project modality is used as 'pilot' to test interventions, up-scaling has to be an objective from the start and not an afterthought. In as much as possible, no interventions should be tested that have no realistic chance of being scaled up (e.g. in terms of cost, time or capacity). The Morogoro Health Project in Tanzania enabled District Councils and health workers to use the available finances more effectively by providing a district-tailored health service. Whilst the project clearly empowered health workers and improved service provision, up-scaling within the national strategy now depends on whether sufficient funds can be found (and justified) for the rather intensive capacity development that is required.
- ii To ensure that what is done is relevant to the national strategy, projects at field level need a continuous two-way communication to national level decision makers. This was demonstrated by experience in Mozambique: Decentralised planning and finance is supported nation-wide through a scaling-up of several pilot projects. A joint government-donor evaluation



was carried out with the expressed purpose of identifying best (project) practices. These were then used as the basis for a national programme and its common framework of objectives.

- iii A key principle of using a project modality under a programme approach is to avoid setting up parallel structures. The classical implementation-oriented project may have depended on a lot of foreign TA, but the 'project as part of a programme' should follow programmatic principles of using (and strengthening) local systems, building upon capacities of local actors and progressing towards adopting local procedures.
- iv Technical assistants in such a project may be short or long term (depending on need) but in any case, care should be taken that all TA has a facilitating role and refrains from taking on implementation responsibilities that they will, ultimately, not be responsible for. Useful experiences were reported from Mozambique and Zambia where projects, following the roles and responsibilities outlined in the national strategy, found that effective pilot work could be done with few TA supporting national systems in a joint 'learning by doing it right' process.

However, experience also shows that this requires a bit of a mind-shift in the development community. Donors have to be weaned off the use of project implementation units; a process that appears to be difficult (70% of projects in the World Bank portfolio still rely on PIU). A possible way forward is to say that in those cases where stand-alone projects are justified, for example where no national frameworks exist or the case of fragile states, there may be some justification for a PIU. However, where national policy and programme frameworks exist, projects have to be based on the principles of the programme-based approach and cannot justify the use of PIUs as parallel structures.

Within the programme-context there is a further, and important, justification for the project modality as support to non-state actors. Several participants voiced concern over the fact that the shift to programme support has caused a narrowing of focus to government at the cost of non-state actors. However, there is no reason why non-state actors cannot be supported in the context of a (sector wide) programme and through a project modality in support of that programme.

Where national strategies are developed in situations with projects on the ground, these existing projects need to be integrated into programme frameworks. One way of doing this may be by using a backward evaluation against a common framework of objectives to identify best practices, as was done in Mozambique. Maybe this can overcome the general reluctance to evaluate projects, as reported on by one of the working groups.

That harmonisation across different modalities is a feasible aim was demonstrated by the cases of Cambodia Education and Mozambique



Decentralisation. In both countries, a common framework as a basis for CD objectives allowed for the subsequent harmonisation between different modalities. In Cambodia, this joint aligned approach allowed for a value added to different modalities and indeed, it appeared that having the framework as a harmonising instrument was more important than the actual mix of modalities on the ground. In fact, participants agreed that all modalities permit better alignment and greater ownership.

The forum asked for more empirical evidence on costs and benefits of different modalities and specifically for a broader debate on TA pooling. There are many different forms of pooling, such as (i) a physical pool of TA under a programme framework at sector or sub-sector level; (ii) a common donor fund (or basket) earmarked for TA or (iii) budget support that includes foreseen funds for TA to be managed by the government. Not enough has been done to collect experience with various forms of TA pooling and their applicability in different (country or programme) situations.

With respect to the use and harmonisation of different modalities at country level, the discussions offered some helpful hints:


- i A jointly developed framework of CD objectives appears essential;
- ii It is useful to have donor working groups in place and functioning, as much of the harmonisation should be worked out at that level and
- iii Joint government-donor sector working groups are a pre-requisite if harmonisation is required in the context of a sector programme; and last but not least
- iv Local systems should be used but not overburdened; increase reliance on local systems and actors as capacity and confidence grows.

#### **How to measure progress on 'indicator 4'?**

*The Paris Declaration has defined "percent of donor capacity development support provided through coordinated programmes consistent with partners' national development strategies" as indicator for joint approaches to CD. Making this indicator operational and avoiding that it serves as a driver of more superficial or narrowly conceived actions remains a joint challenge.*

There was considerable discussion on indicator 4 (see also box 1) and to what extent it actually measures coordinated CD. Doubts included the following:

The use of Technical Cooperation as a proxy for capacity development is not right. Not all TC is about capacity development and not all capacity development is part of TC. Examples were given where Financial Assistance programmes, not recorded under TC, included CD efforts for public finance management. A joint government-donor review of the way donors deliver TC in Mozambique came up with an alternative indicator, namely: Sector-wide TC as



a percentage of total TC whereby sector wide TC is defined as being provided in the context of sector wide programmes. Naturally, this indicator is appropriate in as far as sector wide programmes exist that can integrate TC. This will not always be the case, e.g. in fragile states or in areas not (yet) targeted by sector wide approaches.

Participants further agreed that the OECD/DAC statistics on TC need more clarity: Especially where it concerns distinguishing between TC and TA the current data may be misinterpreted as in the case of Mozambique where total amount of TC was equated to half the public sector wage bill; an outrageous situation at first sight. However, of course, only a proportion of the cost of TC was actually spent on the TAs themselves and it would have been helpful if that distinction could be made.


On the whole, it was felt that although the Paris Declaration is meant to be about effective aid in the widest sense, it does (willingly or unwillingly) introduce bias that may in itself become a cause of ineffective aid. The Paris Declaration falls short in its lack of recognition of the importance of non-state actors and in its lack of acknowledgement of a range of alternative delivery mechanisms that may be more responsive to need. There is a danger that donors equate budget support with 'TC through coordinated programmes' which in turn is equated (by the Paris Declaration itself) to 'CD consistent with partners' development strategies'. This would allow for short-cuts such as 'budget support equals effective aid' rather than the conscientious pursuit of underpinning principles like CD, ownership and the strengthening of country systems.

### **Conclusion: How to support capacity development through joint approaches?**

National capacity development policies are important instruments. They ensure that different CD efforts can be coordinated and that complementarities and synergies can be tapped. In addition, they provide powerful tools to the government in the process of donor coordination. Macro-level CD strategies can effectively address issues that are part of the enabling environment of capacity. Pillars of such an enabling environment include freedom of the press, access to information, rule of law, human rights, security of people and property, civil service conditions, access to higher education, electronic communication etc. A national strategy that aims to ensure that these pillars are in place and functioning provides a vital and fertile foundation for any subsequent CD efforts.

However, whereas an overarching policy has proven to be a force for good; overarching and all-encompassing CD programmes have had such disappointing and at times destructive effects, that it is generally agreed that these should be avoided. Instead, CD programmes should be formulated at a level where a coherent set of activities around a series of common objectives can be identified. Sometimes, this may be at a sector level (e.g. health,





education, transport) sometimes at a cross-sectoral level (e.g. rural development) or at a sub-sectoral level (e.g. micro-finance, public finance management, business promotion). Wherever possible, CD efforts should be mainstreamed into existing development programmes. First because it gives CD itself a clearer focus and second because for (sector) programmes to succeed CD has to be an integral element of their design and implementation.

Both CD policies at macro level and the detailed CD programmes at implementation levels should take account of the role and capacity needs of non-state actors. Consumers have to be able to demand services, the private sector has to generate growth to raise domestic revenue and civil society has to hold government accountable. Government is only one player in the system and too much of a focus on the state at the cost of non-state actors leads to a lopsided development process or none at all.

The choice of modalities with which to support CD should be based on a common framework of objectives developed by the partner and donors together. Different modalities, including TA pooling, budget support or project modalities, can be applied within this framework in such a way that the available TC across donors is balanced over CD needs within and across sectors and between levels of government and non-government actors. Experience has shown that all modalities permit better alignment, provided that a harmonisation tool such as a common framework of objectives exists.

However, two things seem to be needed: First, there has to be more clarity on how to apply different modalities such that they contribute to building the capacity of local systems. The discussion should be less about “which modality is better” but rather on “what are the implications of adhering to the principles of effective aid for each modality?” Discussions during the forum clearly showed that there is a role and place for each modality, provided it is applied in the right way. Second; this better understanding of what it means to support ‘the bigger picture’ should then lead to an approach where situation specific comparative advantages of different modalities are carefully considered. The mix of modalities used, would then depend on a demand driven process, rather than be led by donor procedures or donor preferences.

This would also be in the spirit of the Paris Declaration, which recognises the key importance of countries taking the lead in their own capacity development processes. However, some concern was felt that the way this is measured allows for short-cuts to be made: The proportion of donor CD support that is channelled through national and coordinated programme is important; but it does not automatically imply that the CD process is owned and led by the partner. Therefore a too narrow interpretation of this indicator could compromise due attention to strengthening leadership, ownership and responsibility on the side of the partner.



## HOW TO ASSESS PROGRESS IN CAPACITY AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT?

*“Capacity cannot merely be built by adding components of hardware, people or knowledge. Capacity is latent in people, institutions and societies and can be unleashed if the proper incentives are found”<sup>2</sup>*

Well-written policies and lots of funding have often failed to translate in improved service provision, increased growth or reduced poverty. A crucial bottleneck is capacity. Increasing sums are being spent on capacity development and it is an issue that is likely to attract even more attention in the future, as realisation grows of its crucial role in making aid more effective. However, as efforts towards CD increase, so does the pressure for CD results and it is here that problems are often encountered. Why is it that it is so difficult to measure the capacity *developed* as a direct consequence of CD efforts? Why is it that after so many CD efforts there still exists a lack of knowledge on what works and what doesn't work in CD? In short, what makes CD so difficult and area for monitoring and evaluation?

Some of the reasons for this state of affairs were discussed by Heather Baser and Doug Horton during the introduction to this topic. It begins with the fact that *capacity development* is a term used for a great many things. One can almost talk of any development intervention and call it a CD effort of sorts. Possibly, this all encompassing use of the CD concept, is one of the reasons why CD efforts are often poorly conceived and managed or based on a theory of change that is not well articulated, if at all.

Of course, capacity and capacity development are difficult concepts to describe, let alone define. A definition used by several speakers was that which describes *capacity* as an emergent combination of attributes, (capabilities and relationships) that enable a (human) system to exist, adapt and perform. *Capacity development* was described as the process by which individuals, groups and organizations strengthen their abilities to identify and achieve desired goals over time. Finally, much of the discussion revolved around organisations rather than individuals whereby *organizational capacity development* was defined as: An organizational change process aimed at improving potential to perform (efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, and financial sustainability).

A stumbling block in trying to monitor capacity development is the (sometimes tenuous) connection between capacity, capacity development and performance. Often, performance is taken as a proxy for capacity. But performance is really only capacity that has been used and thus can be measured.

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<sup>2</sup> Samuel Wangwe in *Capacity Development for Mutual and Domestic Accountability*

A central issue of this session is the tension between the two main reasons for monitoring; (i) accountability and (ii) learning. M&E with the purpose of learning is more recent and has largely come out of the organisational development work. The purpose of M&E for accountability is of two kinds: Accountability towards donors and accountability towards local stakeholders. Most often practiced is M&E for reasons of accountability to donors. Sadly, possibly the most important form of M&E is also the least practiced: namely that which is aimed at local accountability and intends to find out whether development goals are achieved from the perspective of the recipient.

The methodology used will depend on the M&E purpose: M&E as a management tool is usually based around questions determined by the organization itself, with some emphasis on qualitative data and a participatory ('learning') process and the building of a consensus around CD strategies. Accountability to donors requires an M&E that is derived from the need for achieving predetermined goals with an emphasis on quantifiable indicators and impact assessments. Finally, M&E as a means to uphold or strengthen local accountability is of a very participatory nature, sometimes with local stakeholders determining the questions and evidence to use and local evaluators leading the process.

In the working groups, examples of different M&E approaches and tools were examined. Possible uses, advantages and disadvantages were discussed of quantitative or on qualitative methods; formal and informal approaches; results-based management and systems approaches. Table 2 presents an overview of presentations by working group.

<b>Table 2: Presentations on How to assess progress in Capacity and Capacity Development?</b>	
WG 1 What are we learning from different approaches to monitoring capacity and capacity development?	
The Benchmarking Assessment Methodology for Tool for Public Procurement Systems: and recent experiences of applying its baseline indicators in <i>Ghana</i>	Michael Lawrance, OECD-DAC Secretariat; A.B. Adjei, Public Procurement Board, Ghana
Capacity Assessment and Monitoring in CD Support Projects in the Solid Waste Management Sector	Mitsuo Yoshida, JICA
Informal Approaches to Monitoring Capacity Development: the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports in <i>Cambodia</i>	H.E. Pok Than, Secretary of State, Ministry of Education, Cambodia; Mike Ratcliffe
WG 2 What are we learning from different approaches to evaluating capacity development?	



<b>Table 2: Presentations on How to assess progress in Capacity and Capacity Development?</b>	
Approaching the intangibles: e-VAL – bringing together different perspectives in evaluation	Karsten Posse, GTZ
Developing and Evaluating Capacity in Research and Development Organisations	Doug Horton
WG 3 How can we use a soft systems approach to monitor and evaluate capacity?	
A balanced approach to measuring capacity: results, relations, visions, adaptation and self-organisation	Heather Baser, European Centre for Development Policy Management
WG 4 Who should decide what to monitor and evaluate and how to do it?	
<i>Tanzania</i> Public Sector Reform: Keeping the agenda in the hands of partner governments	Daniel Kobb
Public Financial Management Reform in <i>Mozambique</i> : Differing donor perspectives and their implications for monitoring and evaluation	Hallgerd Dyrssen, Sida

Throughout the session six questions took central place, which also form the basis for this chapter:

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to monitoring and evaluating capacity and capacity development?
2. How should the purpose of monitoring and evaluation shape the approach we use?
3. Who should define what to monitor or evaluate and how to do it?
4. What is different about monitoring and evaluating capacity and capacity development?
5. How much time and resources should be put into monitoring and evaluating capacity and capacity development, as opposed to development results?
6. What are the implications of the foregoing for implementing the Paris Declaration?




## Advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to monitoring and evaluating capacity and capacity development

In the course of the forum growing emphasis was placed on the importance of the “soft side” of capacity and capacity development. This relates to the more elusive capacities such as ownership, leadership, credibility, legitimacy, mutual confidence, trust, creativity, pro-activeness etc. Also on the side of the partner, the realisation is growing that these are essential qualities towards development, as was reported by the Cambodian Secretary of State. However, whereas developing this soft side of capacity may be difficult; monitoring its progress may pose even bigger challenges. Good experiences were made in the Solid Waste Sector in different Asian countries by using so-called ‘approach-based’ indicators. But whatever the method used, there was widespread agreement that in monitoring the ‘soft side of capacity the role of the partner is essential; monitoring has to be done jointly and against a commonly agreed set of targets.

It appears that the informal approach to monitoring capacity is gaining ground. Its advantage over formal approaches is that it is better equipped to deal with the soft-side of capacity. Also, it is generally cheap, gets at the cause rather than the symptoms. It is thus a potentially low-cost-high-impact method, but only if it is done right. Regrettably, it often is not done right and this indicates the main disadvantage of this approach; it is highly dependent on the (social and technical) skills of the person doing the monitoring. It is very subjective and depends on interpretation. Other difficulties are that not much is written down and access to information is difficult especially from outside the country. One of the working groups questioned whether the informal monitoring approach is such a novelty after all, or whether it is not simply what used to be called diplomacy.

There still is a role for the formal approach to monitoring but it should be justified in relation to what needs to be monitored rather than be used by default. Advantages of the formal approach are that it is comprehensive and thorough, data can easily be compiled and compared and fewer special skills are needed. Formal approaches are useful for result-based approaches, in relation to tangible outcomes (example Public Procurement in Ghana) and for accountability purposes. Disadvantages are that it can be time consuming and costly and is less suitable for soft capacities. Risks of the formal approach include that it focuses on what is visible, public and measurable and that it suffers from problems of attribution and may oversimplify the derivation of cause-effect-impact.

A conclusion of the discussion was that both formal and informal approaches have a role to play and that donors should not over-emphasise the formal results-based approach. The Tanzania Public Sector Reform programme suffered from such an over-emphasis on results-based indicators: Its original M&E framework covered over a thousand indicators based on a simple ‘adding-



up' exercise of accumulated accountability needs among donors. However, little learning was done, partially because of the long lists of matrices produced by this approach. During later programme stages, some of this formal results-based monitoring was retained but it was complemented with qualitative monitoring and report writing focussed on learning lessons.

A concern that ran as an undercurrent in several discussions was that it is all very well to compare approaches, but do we write what matters? An honest review of capacities will bring issues to the fore that have major influences but are not reported on. This concerns not only the regular issues like human rights, corruption and frustration at work but also issues like culture and values such as tribalism and a belief in witchcraft<sup>3</sup>. Several donor representatives said that many of the most crucial impediments to capacity development are of this kind but are systematically excluded from reports.

### How should the purpose of monitoring and evaluation shape the approach?

In general, participants felt that whatever the purpose (accountability or learning) formal and informal approaches complement, and not exclude, each other. What may be needed is a balanced approach to measuring capacity. Such an approach is based on an assessment framework that is developed jointly and where the changes that are expected to occur when capacity improves are described by relevant stakeholders<sup>4</sup>.


However, even with the right approach participants believed that donor agencies do not have what it takes to monitor the soft side of capacity: The skills needed are not there or not sufficiently recognised. A high staff turnover, especially at country level, impedes informal monitoring; and internal agency incentives do not reward monitoring skills. Or as a World Bank representative put it: "you don't get promoted to monitor". Second, assuming that donor agencies have a more comprehensive picture of what is constraining capacity, the next question is whether donors have what it takes to *tackle* the soft side of CD? In many cases, CD support is supply-driven. Where this is the case, donor-led monitoring of capacity tends to zoom in on the things that money can buy (and buy quickly) rather than on more elusive capacity constraints like motivation, pro-activeness, trust and credibility.

With respect to the purpose of CD, experiences from Cambodia and Tanzania showed that accountability and learning do not have to be separate and that results-based M&E systems largely designed for accountability can 'open up' to

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<sup>3</sup> The former may lead to promotion or demotion being based on tribe rather than performance; the latter may lead to fear of pursuing or displaying success for fear of retribution.

<sup>4</sup> ECDPM: A balanced approach to monitoring and evaluating capacity and performance; a preliminary proposal.




allow room for learning by greater involvement of the partner in M&E design and more emphasis on soft capacities and qualitative data. However, an important exception to the above has to be made where indicators are used as 'money triggers'. In such cases the process of dialogue and the process of conditionality should be kept apart. Under the programme approach, budget support is part of a process towards greater ownership, strengthened country systems and increased domestic accountability. This process requires room for learning and an M&E approach that allows honest analysis as a basis for dialogue. Narrowing the M&E approach to a limited set of outcome based indicators that simultaneously act as 'triggers' for further donor disbursement does not provide this room for learning. In such cases, the strands of learning/dialogue and accountability/conditionality should be kept separate each underpinned by appropriate M&E.

### **Who should define what to monitor and evaluate and how to do it?**

A clear finding is that the purpose of M&E determines who defines what and how to monitor. Where learning is a purpose of M&E, the design of the strategy should be driven by those who are meant to do the learning. Where M&E is for accountability, the definition of what and how is best placed with those to whom accountability is owed. In practice this means:

- i For learning purposes it is crucial that M&E outcomes are owned. In Tanzania Public Sector Reform this was successfully achieved not only by developing a joint M&E framework but also by government coordinating the effort and contracting the technical assistance for M&E. Owning outcomes and admitting where problems lie is an important aspect of programme management and contributes significantly to its success.
- ii M&E for accountability is always part of a contract or an agreement and here it is important that M&E frameworks are designed jointly between the parties concerned. Donors and implementing agencies often have different views on capacity and of what constitutes (successful) capacity development. These differences of opinion should not lead to separate frameworks, but should be used as triggers in (bilateral) dialogue and as drivers of change and innovation.
- iii Both for learning and for accountability, it is important that M&E outcomes are endorsed. Especially where qualitative instruments are used, the people interviewed should ideally confirm or authorise the outcome of analysis of the information they provide. GTZ developed a software-package (called eVal) that allows for this: Interviewees first define how to measure success and failure of the project in question; at the end of the interview the answers are translated into a graphic image of the 'view' of the interviewee (on the spot) which is then authorised by the interviewee before being added to the database.

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- iv Experience from Mozambique demonstrated the value of independent M&E especially in certain contexts of accountability. Monitoring of the Public Sector Reform made for a turbulent process with tensions between government and budget support donors. An independent Quality Assurance Group was set up to help broker a formula for a joint approach. Though initially regarded rather sceptically from both sides, the Quality Assurance Group has gained confidence and respect over time and is now an important and impartial advisor to the M&E process.


In what way and to what effect ownership over M&E can change over time can be learned by contrasting the cases of Tanzania and Mozambique both relating to experiences with public sector reform. In Tanzania the M&E system moved away from a donor driven indicator based approach where everything is black and white, into a 'greyer' thematic study approach. Admitting to mistakes has stimulated 'learning by doing' and increased credibility. In Mozambique however, reform began in 1988 as a gradual, incremental process with a long time horizon. By 2001 the growing number of budget donors asked for quicker results and M&E got a technical focus, became TA dependant and IT-driven. Government perspective and ownership was lost in the process thus compromising opportunities for learning.

#### **What is different about capacity and capacity development that affects how we approach monitoring and evaluation?**

An important difference between capacity and other outcomes of development was termed "the challenge of soft" .Capacity development efforts have to address soft side issues like values, corporate culture and morale, in order to be sustainable. But, so far the practice of monitoring and evaluating capacity and capacity development has failed to fully recognise the combination of 'hard' and 'soft' characteristics that make up capacity.

Not only the development but also the monitoring of capacity has to take this soft side into account. This may not sufficiently be taken care of through the use of proxy indicators. Whereas proxy indicators may measure some CD results, vital factors are intangible such as ownership, participation, political willingness and the appropriateness of concepts in culture and tradition. The eVal package overcomes this by capturing soft issues in a quick and structured manner.

A further difference is that capacity and capacity development can easily become political issues especially in the context of organisational reform processes. In Tanzania it was crucial to fight perceptions that the public reform process was pushed by donors: The reform had to be seen as home-grown, whose design and management was led and driven by Tanzanian political and administrative leadership. By inference, also the M&E process had to be driven by government; else it would have been doomed from the start.




A further complication of monitoring capacity development is that the two activities of M&E and CD are intertwined; good M&E is in itself a CD effort which makes it more important how the M&E process is designed as would have been the case for other development results. The organisational development experience presented by Doug Horton shows that “when conducted in a participatory and structured way, evaluation can make a substantial contribution to improving capacity development efforts and overall organisational performance”. This action learning approach to evaluation requires widespread involvement of stakeholders in the process. A participatory approach to M&E of CD helps gain commitment to building the future of an organisation and can speed up decision making. Capacity development usually involves long term incremental processes; Regular M&E results can act as incentives to long term CD processes and can keep the momentum growing. This is even more effective when M&E results are used to officially reward the capacity built as is the case in Ghana where M&E outcomes are used in the issuing of certifications to Procurement Entities.

Finally, a considerable problem in monitoring capacity and CD is the limited competence of parties not least the donors, who lack the skills and understanding to allow a weighing of alternative models of reform and their impact on capacity and cost. This was reported as a main hurdle and a continued challenge in the Mozambique Public Finance Management programme.

#### **How much time and resources should we devote to monitoring and evaluating capacity versus performance?**

The discussion under this issue suffered somewhat from a lack of clarity of concepts. The two constructs of *capacity* and *performance* are not easily kept separate. One of the working groups wondered: “How do you measure capacity whilst not measuring performance?” Monitoring in Ghana Procurement and Cambodia Solid Waste sectors was very much along performance indicators; nevertheless even this approach immediately illuminated capacity constraints and bottlenecks. A possible compromise is to simply ask that measuring performance should be done with a CD antenna. Thus, even where straightforward performance indicators are measured, these cannot simply be used as a proxy for capacity without an assessment of the link between the two. An example was given of the performance monitoring in the Solid Waste Sector which used targets like ‘waste collection rate has increased’. Without knowing who collected and why, it could simply be a case of more money, vehicles or volunteers, without actual capacity improvements. To overcome this, capacity assessment checklists were produced under each of the performance indicators to establish the link between capacity and performance.



Capacity should be monitored carefully and at the start of every programme even if it means that more resources are spent. The reason is that we have to ensure that baseline information is available to inform not only CD interventions but development interventions in general; something which is currently often lacking. This baseline information should then be used as an impulse to credible programme design. Too often, programme capacity needs are derived almost from a simple calculation in the way of: 'programme-capacity requirements minus available capacity = CD needs'. This has led to the formulation of ambitious programmes with huge CD components that have often proved not feasible. Instead, programmes should be designed based on 'available capacity plus realistic CD impact = programme scope'. Or in the words of a participant: "any development programme first has to be built on available capacities before CD efforts are built on lacking capacities after"


Ownership of and participation in M&E processes is of crucial importance where it concerns capacity and CD. Therefore, these M&E processes may be more expensive than other M&E processes but that is the price to pay as was learned the hard way in Mozambique which reported that "CD takes time irrespective of a hurry for outputs and wishes to increase budget support".

Because CD processes take time, monitoring activities will need to be planned with long-term horizons. Many CD interventions have suffered from M&E data that cannot be compiled or compared over time due to constant changes in the type and method of data being collected. Better design and planning may well mean that long-term M&E strategies cost more time and money than would be the case for shorter term M&E, but these expenses will have to be taken on board.

### **What are the implications for the Paris Declaration?**

Questions were raised under the Paris Declaration objective that donors align under country strategies: Much as it was agreed that this represents a laudable aim, participants wondered whether it is a realistic scenario. Or, as formulated by a working group: "Will it be donors harmonising and governments following donor rules or donors aligning under government rules?"

There was widespread agreement that capacity development should be made central to the Paris Declaration, more so than it is at present, if the declaration's aim of effective aid is to be met. Whereas the declaration acknowledges that capacity is the key to making aid more effective and achieving the MDGs, its targets and indicators offer too much opportunity for short-cuts. Indicators and targets are too narrowly focussed on products without taking due account of the processes underpinning these. i.e. the 'soft side' of development. For example, although the Paris Declaration asks for the existence of national development strategies, more important than these strategies being there is how they were prepared. Strategies written by bands of consultants flown in for the purpose will



not be the stepping stones to effective aid that the Paris Declaration is looking for.

Another issue put forward in many discussions was that the Paris Declaration's use of 'performance' as a proxy for 'capacity' is risky for two main reasons: (i) Not all capacity translates in performance: Only capacity that is used and used effectively can be measured by such a proxy. By equating performance to capacity, the Paris Declaration risks lumping together issues of capacity and enabling environments in an unhelpful way; (ii) not all performance is based on capacity: Sometimes performance indicators go up because of more staff, more equipment and more money without actually having improved capacity.


Nevertheless, it is realised that a global initiative will have to depend on proxies in order to be manageable. However, more effort should be spent to define and qualify proxies so that these indicators can really measure progress towards effective aid.

### **Conclusion: How to assess progress in capacity and capacity development?**

The importance of the 'soft side' of capacity is increasingly realised but this does not mean that we are therefore better able to deal with it. Issues like ownership, leadership, legitimacy, credibility, confidence, trust and creativity are essential qualities towards development, both from the perspective of the donors as well as the recipients. But these qualities are difficult to measure and monitor. Methods that are helpful tend to be of the sort in which a wide spectrum of largely qualitative information is absorbed and digested in an informal way. Getting this right depends on the personality of the 'monitor' and requires a fair amount of interpersonal and diplomatic skills.

Ironically, in the current programme era of demand-led development, there is an increased need for informal approaches and interpersonal skills; yet, there appears to be less of them around: High rates of donor staff turnover and the withdrawal of donor representatives from implementation levels (to reside in capitals) make that a lot of that 'finger on the pulse' is lost.

In addition to a lack of skills to monitor 'the soft side', donor-led monitoring may also be determined by the kind of CD support that is available. Where CD is supply driven, donor monitoring of capacity tends to focus on the things that money can buy (and buy quickly) such as training, research and consultants. Even if the soft side of capacity and CD needs was captured effectively, the question remains whether donors would be able to address that part. With the awareness growing on the critical role of things like trust, credibility and legitimacy, there appears to be need for more information on how these can be fostered.



In general, monitoring and evaluation serves two main purposes; that of accountability and that of learning. The monitoring for 'learning' that is less about measuring progress but more about learning lessons shows a lot of promise and is appreciated by donors and partners alike. Learning and accountability need not always be kept separate. In some cases systems that were set up for accountability purposes simply added in value when they were opened up to more learning based approaches and indicators. However, encouraging as this may be, there is an important exception to be made: Where performance monitoring indicators are simultaneously used as 'triggers' for aid disbursement this does not allow for a honest analysis of results and a dialogue aimed at learning lessons. In such cases, the strands of dialogue/learning and conditionality/accountability should be kept separate.

Capacity should be monitored carefully at the start of any programme of development. This should be done jointly with the partner and provide a baseline not only for future progress monitoring, but also for programme design itself. Every effort should be made to not design overambitious programmes, but to instead use the available capacity plus an estimation of a feasible CD impact as a tool to delineate the possible scope of the programme. It is better to have an incremental but feasible strategy than pursue a big leap, big disappointment trajectory.

Capacity development should be made central to the Paris Declaration, more so than it is at present, if its aim of effective aid is to be met. Whereas the declaration acknowledges that capacity is the key to making aid more effective and achieving the MDGs, its targets and indicators offer too much opportunity for short-cuts. Less important than whether national strategies are there, is whether these are owned; less important than money being channelled through the treasury is that local systems and procedures are strengthened by doing so.



## HOW TO STRENGTHEN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH MUTUAL AND DOMESTIC ACCOUNTABILITY?

*“Aid dependence is positively related with accountability to donors and negatively related with accountability to domestic constituencies”<sup>5</sup>*

The third of the forum topics dealt with the issue of accountability and capacity development. Earlier forum discussions had confirmed the finding that development practice tends to emphasise the accountability from partner country governments to donors. This session also addressed two further lines of accountability, namely from donors to partner country governments and from partner governments to their own citizens.


Accountability is sometimes defined as ‘the means by which individuals and organisations report to a recognised authority and are held responsible for their actions’. For this session, however, a wider view of accountability was used representing the relationship between a rights-holder and the agents responsible for fulfilling that right. Two main types of accountability were discussed: *Mutual accountability* that works in both directions and is based on a contract or an agreement between parties. Although mutual accountability can be between any of two or more partners, in this forum it was used to denote the accountability between donors and partner countries; *Domestic accountability* which covers the spectrum of accountability relations within countries whether they relate to vertical relations between citizens and their representatives holding public office or to horizontal mechanisms by which different (state) institutions hold each other accountable.

Unfortunately, these two types of accountability do not necessarily reinforce each other: In fact, mutual accountability between donors and partners may undermine domestic accountability. In high aid dependent countries, government salaries are not covered by the taxpayers; service provision is not paid for by the users. In such cases, the donor aid provided effectively removes government further away from the people it is meant to serve. For this reason, it is crucial that where donor-partner accountability is pursued, it is done so in a way that does not weaken, but preferably strengthens domestic accountability. For this reason, an important objective of this session therefore was to see not only how mutual accountability can be *strengthened* but especially how it can be *anchored* in domestic accountability processes.

That improved accountability is a basis for effective aid and development is recognised also in the Paris Declaration. Mutual accountability between donors and partners is one of the main aims of the declaration. Progress against this is measured by indicator 12 which establishes the number of countries where partner authorities and donors engage in a national level review of mutual

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<sup>5</sup> Doug Horton in *Notes on WG 4 on Strengthening capacity through accountability*



performance (see box 2). Domestic accountability is recognised by the Paris Declaration with commitments towards parliamentary oversight and participatory processes (§ 48). No special indicator has been formulated to measure progress against this commitment.

**Box 2: Paris Declaration: Mutual accountability**

47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability and transparency in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance.

48a. **Partner countries** commit to strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development strategies and/or budgets;

48b. **Partner countries** commit to reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies.

49. **Donors** commit to provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their legislatures and citizens.

50. **Partner countries and donors** commit to jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mutual progress in implementing agreed commitment on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments (indicator 12)

Indicator 12: **Mutual accountability**: Number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness including those in this Declaration.

Indicator 12 target for 2010: 100% of countries undertake mutual assessments of progress

Thomas Theisohn introduced the discussions under this session by presenting an overview of strategic entry points for strengthening accountability relations. Entry points included: Establishing reliable and legitimate pro-poor rules; increase transparency and access to information; establish facts as a basis for dialogue; maintain regular monitoring; improve access of poor to arbitration; move accountability loops closer to people; strengthen participation in political processes and strengthen the voice and ability to articulate, especially among civil society. Country cases and studies presented in the four working groups offered illustrations of these entry points and the instruments or mechanisms that can be used (see table 3).

**Table 3: Presentations on How to strengthen CD through mutual and domestic accountability?**

WG 1 Anchoring mutual accountability in domestic accountability; Civil society perspectives	
Real Accountability: improving aid through better accountability	Jasmine Burnley, ActionAid
Contributions of human rights frameworks and mechanisms to the promotion of mutual accountability	Sebastian Bartsch, OECD-DAC Secretariat
WG 2 Anchoring mutual accountability in domestic accountability; between donors and parliament	
Maximising Accountability around Technical Cooperation	Tessa MacArthur, DFID
Working with Parliamentarians to improve their capacity to oversee economic policy; the case of <i>South Africa</i>	Nhlanhla Nene, Portfolio Committee on Finance, South Africa; Neal Cohen, formerly USAID
WG 3 Flexible approaches to forge mutual accountability: addressing the political economy of aid relations	
Accountable cooperation through flexible brokering and mutual trust in <i>Uganda</i>	Godfrey Ssebukulu, TSC, Uganda
A promising approach to mutual accountability: the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG) in <i>Tanzania</i>	Samual Wangwe, Tanzania
WG 4 Exploring promising ground to strengthen capacity through accountability	
Capacity for mutual accountability: domestic resource mobilisation; the case of <i>Kenya</i>	Peter Kubebea and Michael Otieno, National Taxpayers Association, Kenya
Accountability and domestic resource revenue mobilisation	Ben Dickinson, OECD DAC Secretariat



The discussions were structured around four central questions:

1. What are promising experiences in mutual accountability between developing countries and donors?
2. How can mutual accountability arrangements be tied into domestic accountability systems?
3. What accountability mechanisms can cope with the reality of vested interests and power differentials?
4. What are guiding criteria or promising pillars of mutual accountability arrangements?

The primary objective of the discussion in addressing the above questions was to identify potential avenues and innovations that should become 'defaults' mechanisms in development cooperation. Essential features of promising practice were highlighted and are reported here.


#### **What are promising experiences in building trust and ownership through mutual accountability mechanisms between developing countries and donors?**

*The Paris declaration stipulates "mutual accountability" and even dedicates indicator 12 to assessing mutual progress through "increasingly objective country level mechanisms". What mechanisms do in principle qualify? What makes them effective?*

Despite the current rhetoric on accountability in aid relationships, participants to the forum actually questioned the meaning of 'mutual' in this context by pointing out that accountability was very seldom mutual, as donors are not held accountable by recipients. What is lacking in the equation is the element of 'conditionality'. Whereas donors can enforce accountability from partner countries on the basis of conditionality, partner governments do not have a similar 'stick-and-carrot' instrument in hand. Yet, there was widespread agreement that the agenda towards aid effectiveness will be compromised *unless* donors are held accountable, in the very least by partner country governments but possibly also by populations in the South. The discussion highlighted two major areas where the accountability from donors towards partner country governments is especially critical: (i) predictability of aid <sup>6</sup> and (ii) role of technical assistance. With regard to the former, the predictability of aid, one of the working groups noted that especially in aid dependent countries the instability and unpredictability of aid jeopardises development in general, but capacity development in particular, as an area particularly sensitive to being targeted for budget cuts.

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<sup>6</sup> Aid is predictable when a country can be confident about the amount and timing of aid disbursements.



The role of TA as a second main area of mutual accountability generated a lot of discussion<sup>7</sup>. Forum opinion regarding TA was much divided: some consider it essential to effective aid; others see it as “donor-driven, over-priced and ineffective with respect to what should be its major objective namely the achievement of greater self-reliance in recipient countries”<sup>8</sup>. Nevertheless, it was widely agreed that TA are more accountable to the donor that pays them than to the partner institution they are meant to support; a situation that does nothing to build trust and ownership.

Based on this realisation, considerable consensus was achieved over the fact that a new conceptual framework is needed for the role of TA in the aid effectiveness agenda. DFID has gone some way to prepare such a conceptual framework laid out in its *How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel*, the key points of which were well received and are based on a vision of a more market oriented approach to TC where it is untied from donor suppliers but procured directly by partner countries through national systems. It requires that donors view TC less as a ‘donor instrument’ but more as a ‘good’ that partners can source directly through a well functioning market. This vision was supported among others by experience from Tanzania where it was reported that country ownership was undermined because TA was procured through donor mechanisms which did not provide for any upstream scrutiny of qualifications and suitability by receiving units in Tanzania.


Much as it was emphasised that CD efforts should be part of national strategies, experience made in South Africa suggests that in some cases it may be more effective to support capacity development for its own sake and not linked to a specific policy or programme. USAID support was simply aimed at training parliamentarians to analyse economic policy and to draw their own conclusions. It was non-prescriptive support and ‘untied’ in the sense that it served no other purpose in the form of a wider programme of development. There was little need for conditionality and USAID was seen as a trusted partner without its own agenda.

Much needs to be done on the side of the donor to lay the foundation for mutual accountability. Recommendations included: Donors themselves need capacity development in programme design; managers and staff need to be rewarded on the basis of programme performance (and not disbursement quotes); and the rapid rotation and turnover of staff needs to be addressed, especially at country levels. One recommendation in particular stood out in this context and that is that donor country teams need sufficient authority and flexibility to respond to

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<sup>7</sup> A helpful definition was provided by DFID in which technical cooperation (TC) is defined as the provision of know-how as one input to the complex process of capacity development; ‘TC personnel’ refers to the consultants and specialists involved in this transfer of knowledge. Personnel working for DFID as the main client are administrators and not counted under TC. In this context TA may be equated to TC personnel.

<sup>8</sup> ActionAid, Making Technical Assistance Work




local conditions. This relates to the upward accountability of donor staff in-country to their head-offices abroad. Sometimes this upward accountability is so strong (and procedures so demanding) that accountability downward (i.e. from the donor in country to the recipient) becomes near impossible. From Tanzania it was recommended that donor head offices should take more account of achievements by their country staff and should strengthen mechanisms within donor systems to feed best practices upwards.

A lot of mention was made of the role of regional forums and international agreements in supporting mutual accountability. Examples included agreements such as the Cotonou Agreement or regional platforms like the Africa Partnership Forum and the Africa Progress Panel. At the international level suggestions included the OECD/DAC Peer Review mechanism, the Economic and Social Council and global monitoring reports of the IMF and the World Bank. With regard to the DAC, discussion in the plenary ('fishbowl') suggested a possible DAC-role in improving the quality and availability of information on donor performance as gauged by the recipient. Possibly this can be linked to an initiative where recipients at country level are allowed to 'rank' their donors or an initiative where civil society sets up a centre like Transparency International that monitors donors' performance.

In general, with regard to mutual accountability, participants agreed with the objective of the Paris Declaration that the way forward has to be based on a process that works towards allowing recipient countries take the lead in their own capacity development. Jointly agreed frameworks of CD objectives and mutual assessments of progress on commitments towards these objectives, as stipulated by the Paris Declaration, are important instruments in this process. However, to avoid that a narrow interpretation of this indicator 12 simply results in a series of joint assessments and reviews rather than accountability per se, participants offered the following suggestions:

- i Monitoring of aid relations and aid effectiveness by independent bodies (i.e. external to donors and government) makes for a much more honest and effective dialogue and allows for trust and ownership to be built, especially on the side of the recipient. A good example is the Independent Monitoring Group which grew out of a crisis between the government of Tanzania and its main donors, and has helped turn that situation around into Tanzania now being considered a pioneer in aid harmonisation and alignment.
- ii Donors have to be willing to share information such as conceptual documents, strategic frameworks, work-plans and budgets, both with government and between each other. Experience from Uganda and Kenya showed that coordinated assistance is undermined by unwillingness among donors to lay their cards on the table; whether at a sector level (e.g. micro-finance in Uganda) or at a country level (Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy).

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- iii Donors have to formulate a transparent policy on conditionality that is linked to a credible expectation of achievement. Contributions from different countries to the working group discussions suggested that sometimes conditionality is formulated around ambitious outcomes or is used in an unclear and ad-hoc way. The effect of both is a stop-and-go aid disbursement undermining mutual and domestic accountability.
  - iv A lack of trust on the side of donors is often based on fears that the country, if left alone, would make mistakes. A suggestion from Tanzania is to let those fears be discussed in a non-threatening way with a focus on dialogue rather than conditionality and be translated into jointly formulated programmes of capacity development.
  - v Related to this, recipient country representatives asked for a distinction in the function of TA whereby their contribution to policy dialogue is separated from direct advice on the allocation of resources. Otherwise the process of dialogue is too much connected to conditionality and will no longer be open and transparent.

#### **How can mutual accountability arrangements be tied into domestic accountability?**


*The Paris commitments recognise the importance of domestic accountability, parliamentary oversight and participatory practices. What are promising approaches to strengthen such domestic accountability? How can domestic accountability mechanisms replace or shape particular arrangements in the aid relationship?*

The OECD/DAC work on promoting accountability through domestic resource revenue provided some of the backdrop to this discussion<sup>9</sup>. According to this analysis high levels of aid that are equal (or exceed) government budgets raise important questions about the disconnections between governments and their citizens. One question is whether the attention paid by governments to donor demands tends to displace attention from the politics of improving domestic revenue collection. One of the working groups put it succinctly by saying that the higher the share of aid in the budget, the lower the chances of genuine country ownership. Or in the words of one of the working groups: “Aid dependence is positively related with accountability to donors and negatively related to accountability to domestic constituencies”.

Fortunately, experience analysed by the OECD/DAC suggests that revenue authority programmes supported by donors in Africa and elsewhere have built stronger institutions and even had an impact on poverty reduction. The central concept here is ‘the fiscal contract’ described by one of the working groups as

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<sup>9</sup> Note on promoting accountability through domestic resource revenue mobilisation. Room document 12, Network on Governance, OECD-DAC




the responsibility of recipients of resources to account for the use of these resources to those who provide them. To the extent that governmental resources are provided by the citizens, accountability is to local constituencies based on the principle that the representative from the Kenyan National Taxpayers Association called *value for tax money*. Realising this means that donors should think carefully about sequencing interventions which they propose for developing countries. Currently, driven by poverty reduction processes, donors are focussing on expenditure priorities such as those in health and education. Effective aid should ask for support to expenditure to be balanced with support to revenue mobilisation. However, as evidenced by the OECD/DAC study, at present donors prioritise expenditure over revenue issues by a ration of 30 to 1.

That this situation harbours particular risks was pointed out by a working group stating that “the most aid dependent countries tend to have the least legitimate governments which depend for their existence on support from international donors”. In such cases, there is not only little chance for domestic accountability, there is little chance for development! Based on this, participants agreed that for aid to be effective in strengthening domestic accountability more attention needs to be paid to programmes supporting domestic revenue collection. These programmes should take account of taxation at the national and at the local level. As was pointed out by Kenya, tax collection at the local level is often overlooked in national programmes although they collect a significant amount of revenue. Local authorities in Kenya collect billions of shillings in revenue that are not covered and often are used without proper or any accountability at all.


A related but different approach to strengthening domestic accountability is by supporting the quality of the budget process. This includes, but is not limited to, the quality of the budget itself, where more attention should be paid to the revenue side to balance the current bias toward expenditures. But it also refers to the process itself: In Tanzania much can be gained from supporting the budget formulation, which is seen as the weakest link in the budget process. In South Africa, a lot of impact resulted from support to the budget evaluation by parliament by supporting parliamentarians to understand the annual budget speech of the Minister of Finance.

A final and somewhat provocative statement in the deliberations around the social-fiscal contract is to pour money in at the bottom, which refers to looking at ways in which a support to increased revenue mobilisation can be balanced by support among the population to either raise more revenue or pay for what would otherwise be free government services. In this way, government budgets in aid dependent countries facing urgent social expenditures can be boosted from the bottom, by the population (or clients of service providers), rather than by donors from the top.



Although the discussion under this issue emphasised revenue mobilisation, other mechanisms to support domestic accountability were mentioned and included the following:

- i The importance of demand-led support: Presenters from Uganda and South Africa claimed that the key determinant in establishing domestic accountability had been that support was based on a request from within the country. Though it is common sense that one feels more responsible for things one has asked for oneself, donors still continue to expect domestic accountability even for support that is supply-led and donor driven.
- ii The importance of strong political ownership: A general rule seems to be that the higher and more visible the political support, the more likely that the programme will be rooted in and be contributing to domestic accountability. The South African support to parliamentarians is a good example as the programme was endorsed by the President himself.
- iii Enable a longer tenure of Memoranda of Understanding and similar instruments between donors and partner countries. At present, MoUs are too easily overridden; either because they are not binding and nearly always contain clauses that stipulate that in the case of conflict donor procedures take precedence, or because signatories represent individuals rather than organisations.
- iv Make the budget support process open to civil society, to create awareness that budget support is not a gift to government, but rather represents funds entrusted to government *on behalf* of the population in recipient countries. This being the case, these populations not only have a right, but also a need to know what their government received if they are expected to hold them accountable for it.
- v Encourage consultation groups to focus on donors' accountability downwards for example in the form of commitments by sector working groups, donor working groups, stakeholder platforms etc.
- vi Where TA is part of a wider programme (such as a SWAP) then the monitoring process for the programme should also cover TA rather than treat it like an 'external' to the programme which does not appear in policy or progress documentation.
- vii Do not use TA to fill gaps in the public service, apart from crisis situations that require a short term response. Instead, focus on filling those gaps domestically for sustainable public sector capacity.
- viii Donors should practice what they preach and give space (and time) for country leadership and ownership to take root. At times, this may involve extra discipline on the part of the donors, for example where public servants themselves favour the use of Project Implementation Units because they may be eligible to work in them or where government is tempted to use TA



as poor conditions make it difficult to find good people in domestic markets (example offered by Tanzania).

**What accountability mechanisms are particularly suitable for coping with the political economy, vested interests and power differentials?**

*Progress in achieving development objectives are subject to political processes beyond the direct control of any partner. It is also a function of the quality of relationships, clear 'rules of the game' and effective ways of dealing with undue influence. What mechanisms are useful, effective and sufficiently robust to deal with such pressures?*


Addressing the political economy of aid and aid dependence led to a discussion on aid predictability and aid volatility as main problems in aid dependent countries. The OECD-DAC contribution indicated that aid flows are up to 40 times more volatile<sup>10</sup> than fiscal revenues, raising important long term issues of institutional sustainability. To prevent that the resultant instability jeopardises CD efforts, the need for country owned capacity development policies was emphasised. Where CD policies are tied to a particular aid flow, there is a risk that the policy goes under when the money stops. A more stable set-up in an aid dependent country would be to have comprehensive CD master plans that donors can buy into. These can be at sector, cross-sector or sub-sector level (e.g. micro-finance in Tanzania) but important is that the plan is country owned and not dependent on the support of a particular donor.

Another working group warned against the notion that accountability can be designed by cleverly constructed mechanisms. Instead, accountability is a function of a series of dynamic processes between government, civil society, private sector and donors, which evolves into lesser or more degrees of accountability between different parties. Realising this has a number of implications: First is the fact that the donor itself is part of the equation and that any activities on the part of the donor have an accountability impact elsewhere in the system. Much as we like to talk of the donor as a catalyst, this metaphor of an entity that triggers but itself does not take part in a chemical reaction does not represent the reality. Thus it is important that donors assess in what way their actions influence the balance of accountability. Second, when seeing domestic accountability as a product of dynamic relations between different actors, this also means that domestic accountability can only be truly fostered when support to these actors is balanced. Participants to the forum argued for attention especially to the following key players:

- i Support to parliament is vital in strengthening domestic political economies. The USAID support to South African parliamentarians is an example of how donors can strengthen horizontal accountability with very limited external

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<sup>10</sup> Aid is volatile when fluctuations in aid flows are large relative to the volume involved.



input. In response to the question whether South Africa needed a donor for this, it was mentioned that in a context of a recent democracy under pressure to show quick results on overcoming the inequalities of society, the idea of using public money to educate parliamentarians was politically difficult. However, once established the programme is now run entirely on South African funds and so the donor simply helped overcome an “acceptance threshold”. Presenters from Tanzania and Kenya also made the case for direct support to the parliament, whereby it was stipulated that the role of parliament needs to go beyond the annual budget and should influence medium term and long term planning and policy making.

- ii Sometimes, even in situations of weak domestic accountability, the mass media is a force for good, as is the case in Tanzania. Donor support to this sector is possible, as long as it is general, neutral, accessible to all, not linked to political parties or opinions and, most importantly, demand led.
- iii There is a need to harmonise (support to) programmes at sector level and at local government level. Where there is tension between decentralisation efforts under sector programmes and local government development programmes, this often results in a clash of interests and (political) mandates at local levels (example from Tanzania). Clear ‘rules of the game’ are especially relevant at these implementation levels.
- iv Linkages between central and sector ministries need to be strengthened: From several countries it was reported that vested interests result in sector-donor collaborations that undermine accountability to the centre. Of course, at times both the sector ministry and the donor may lack confidence in the Ministry of Finance, but even in situations where this is justified, support to the sector should be balanced with repairing the connection from the sector to the centre.
- v The scope of public-private partnerships in strengthening domestic accountability is much under-utilised and at risk of being further marginalised in the drive towards budget support. Two good examples of such PPPs presented at the forum were the Micro Finance Forum in Uganda and the National Taxpayers Association in Kenya. Not represented but mentioned was the Private Sector Foundation in Uganda. All three are examples of much valued platforms of dialogue and policy formulation based on common interests.

In general, with regard to the mechanisms for coping with vested interests and the political economy, it can be said that these are more effective when they are joint and/or independent. A good example here is the Independent Monitoring Group, an autonomous body appointed by the Government of Tanzania and the donors. Jointly formulated codes of conduct of memoranda of understanding strengthen mutual accountability; donor working groups and joint assistance strategies exert peer pressure.



## What criteria can guide and what propositions on promising practice should serve as pillars of mutual accountability arrangement?


*Accountability mechanisms will need to fit the purpose and context. But critical criteria or features may be identified that safeguard their effectiveness. What are some of the critical innovations that should be pursued as a matter of priority in establishing acceptable ground rules and instruments? Perspectives and the perception of relative importance of measure may differ with constituency.*

With respect to the development of capacity, mutual accountability has to be based on ownership of the programme by the partner. Where partners don't own the strategy, they will not feel responsible (or accountable) for it. Thus, partners should (be supported) to lead CD in their countries based on:

- i A national CD policy based on a common framework of objectives formulated between partners and donors and integrating stakeholder views.
- ii The policy does not have to be translated into a programme on a 1:1 basis. It can be implemented in stages (incrementally) or by a series of complementary CD efforts. Important is that the policy provides a relatively comprehensive framework that addresses capacity creation, capacity utilisation and capacity retention based on (or linked to) national development strategies. Such a framework would allow individual CD efforts to be coordinated for complementarities to be tapped and synergy to be developed.
- iii A jointly designed M&E framework as the basis for independent monitoring. Where such independent monitoring mechanisms have not yet been established, monitoring should be done jointly and preferably involve actors beyond the government and its donors (e.g. academia, private or NGO sectors)
- iv A clear exit strategy formulated by partners and donors together along a series of milestones towards sustainability.

Any development programme and associated CD support should be built on an in-depth analysis of available capacity. The formulation of over-ambitious programmes should be avoided; instead an incremental approach where capacity is first built in key areas and towards achievable objectives should be followed. This helps to avoid a situation where indicators are not met and conditionality is applied which undoes the trust and partnership built during design phases. Key areas for CD that are useful catalysts for change are: capacity for aid coordination and aid management; Public Finance Management; procurement systems and streamlining the business environment.

An interesting finding is that CD efforts should try to target a critical mass to foster sustainability. Especially where CD is part of a system-development or



system-reform effort, the more ambitious (or invasive) the reform required, the larger the critical mass needed for it to be effective and sustainable. Otherwise, vested interests or routine practices will soon take over again. In South Africa, the fact that, over a quarter of parliamentarians was trained was a key determinant of success of the programme.

Within national frameworks for CD or based on national development plans, opportunities should be identified where CD can be supported for its own sake based on request by public or private organisations and not necessarily linked to CD needs in the context of a donor supported development programme. Where TC is required, this has to be based on a much more systematic approach to assessing the context of TC <sup>11</sup>. Attention should be paid to:

- i The exact mix of TC that is needed for CD objectives (e.g. research, training, country exchange visits, consultants)
- ii In the case of consultants: the type of person or team required for the context. Allowing the partner to interview short-listed consultants will help ensure that these have the interpersonal skills that are required by the client;
- iii Assessing the projected impact of the provision of such consultants on the labour market in the country and on public government (e.g. unfair competition or brain-drain).


Participants also reported of experiences where CD has not worked, for example where training is allowance-driven and workshops are conducted, not for their content but for their allowances. CD has also not worked where speed of delivery has prevailed over the needs for sustainability or in the absence of incentives for capacity utilisation and retention. Finally, CD in the public service has not worked in the absence of a public sector reform vision within which CD is embedded.

A cornerstone in the accountability-foundation on the side of the donor is the flexibility and autonomy to respond to the country-context. Where donor representatives are pushed more by their head-offices than they are pulled by the partner institutions they are meant to support, then accountability lines upwards will always dominate those downward and much of the scope for trust and mutual accountability is lost. Further promising practices, mechanisms or criteria that came to the fore during the presentations and discussions include the following:

Governments should prepare clear policies on accepting aid that (i) issue unambiguous messages to donors (ii) enables government take a leading role in donor coordination and (iii) works as a regulatory instrument within government and allows (or requires) government to say 'no'. One such condition is that development assistance needs to be untied to allow for a

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<sup>11</sup> See also DFID's How to Note on *How to provide Technical Cooperation personnel*



tailored response to country needs, based on a value-for-money assessment of available support and working towards greater ownership and mutual accountability.

Priority should be given to strengthening procurement processes in partner countries: Donor fears that procurement is a major area of corruption and patronage perpetuates donor resistance to using country systems and procedures. Justified as these fears may be in some cases, unless action is taken to overcome these, there will be little movement towards Paris Declaration commitments.

Support to government should be supplemented by support to non-state actors, as domestic accountability needs to be demanded as well as offered. In many countries, the role of key stakeholders such as civil society and the private sector was curtailed in the immediate post-independence period. This either eroded their capacity to participate in the policy making process or did not create a conducive environment for the development of such capacity<sup>12</sup>. In particular opportunities offered by public-private-partnerships for local development and in public service delivery should be utilised.

Progress monitoring should use simpler M&E tools, follow shorter loops between data collection and data analysis and be carried out more frequently (instead of depending on the cumbersome, time consuming two year reviews). National and international forums should review progress on commitments in international aid relations; statistics with regard to aid predictability and aid volatility should be compiled, disseminated and acted upon. Donor head offices should put in place mechanisms that allow them to learn from experiences made at the country level. These experiences should be taken on board; responsibility should be delegated to country offices to enable a best-fit design of support; blueprints for support packages should be avoided.


### **Conclusion: How to strengthen capacity development through mutual and domestic accountability?**

Commitments towards mutual accountability between donors and partner countries have to take account of an uneven playing field. Whereas donors can use conditionality to hold partners accountable; partners have no such stick-and-carrot instrument. Donor accountability towards its partners has to come out of commitments at international level; country level agreements like Memoranda of Understanding; peer-pressure at international and national fora as well as donors own discipline.

To foster mutual accountability at country levels, it is important that partners (are supported to) lead CD processes in their country. Good practice suggests

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<sup>12</sup> *Capacity development for mutual and domestic accountability: reflections on the Tanzanian experience* by Samuel Wangwe



that where possible these should be based on common frameworks of objectives; be linked to national development strategies; have a jointly designed M&E framework as the basis for independent monitoring; and have a clear exit strategy. Mutual accountability from the donor to the recipient within such a CD process is especially desirable in the areas of (i) aid predictability and (ii) the use of technical assistance. With respect to aid predictability it is suggested that information on donor performance be assessed internationally, be made transparent and widely available, possibly together with a 'ranking' of donors by the recipient.

With respect to the use of TA, it is suggested that a conceptual framework for the use of TA in the context of the aid effectiveness agenda is developed. This has to start from a systematic approach to assessing the context for the whole package of CD options, one of which is TA. Where it is decided that TA is required, careful consideration should be given to the type, mix (international and local) and role of consultants that is needed. A much more market oriented approach to TA is needed, whereby it is untied from donor suppliers but sourced directly by partner countries. This requires that donors see TA less as a 'donor instrument' and more as a 'good' that partners can source directly through a well-functioning market.

In the interest of domestic accountability it is important that donors balance their support to expenditure with support to domestic revenue mobilisation. The importance of this is underlined by the finding that aid dependence is positively related with accountability to donors and negatively related with accountability to local constituencies. Therefore, if donors don't want to be part of the problem, they have to take account of their own impact in the domestic accountability equation.

Paying attention to domestic revenue should also include local government. Not only is a significant proportion of domestic revenue collected at that level (and not always accounted for) but local authorities have an important responsibility towards local development and are accountable to local constituencies. Other promising avenues towards supporting domestic accountability include; support to parliament; the mass media; strengthening the linkage between sector and central ministries and assessing the scope of public private partnerships.

The foundation for mutual accountability that is anchored in domestic accountability has to be built on ownership of the development programme by the partner. Where governments don't own the strategy, they will not feel responsible (or accountable) for it. A cornerstone in the accountability-foundation on the side of the donor is the flexibility and autonomy to respond to the country-context. Where donor representatives are pushed more by their head-offices than they are pulled by the partner institutions they are meant to support, then accountability lines upwards will always dominate those downward and much of the scope for trust and mutual accountability is lost.

## ANNEX 1 : FORUM PROGRAMME

### Programme – Overview

	Tuesday 3rd	Wednesday 4th	Thursday 5th
<b>Morning</b>	<b>Opening</b> Addresses of welcome  <b>Topic 1:</b> How to support CD through joint approaches Introductory Speech Presentations and parallel working groups	Report on results of previous day including open space  <b>Topic 2:</b> How to assess progress in Capacity and Capacity Development? Introductory speech Presentations and parallel working groups	Report on results of previous day including topic 3  <b>Open Space</b>  <b>Final Resume:</b> Plenary session: discussions of forum results
	Presentation of working group results of topic 1  <b>Open Space</b> Introduction on open space and collection of topics Parallel open space sessions	Presentation of working group results of topic 2  <b>Topic 3:</b> How to strengthen CD through mutual and domestic accountability? Introductory speech Presentations and parallel Working Groups  Dinner	Closing Session  <b>LenCD meeting</b> Future Strategy of LenCD – Open to interested participants
<b>Afternoon</b>			



## Programme in detail

### Monday 2 October

19.00 Welcome cocktail reception at “Kigwa-Waterfalls” at the Safari Park Hotel

### Tuesday 3 October

8.00 Registration

#### 9.00 Opening and Welcome Address

Welcome address by Andrew Gidamis, African Institute for Capacity Development (AICAD), Eduard Westreicher, Chair GovNet, OECD/DAC, Andreas Proksch, LenCD Coordinator.

9.30 Overview of the forum, expectations

10.15 **Introduction into Topic 1:  
How to support Capacity Development through joint approaches? Introduction by Nils Boesen, Ben Dickinson, GovNet, OECD/DAC**

10.45. Break

#### 11.15 **Breakout session Topic 1: four parallel working groups:**

##### **Working group 1: Towards Joint Approaches to Capacity Development in SWAp: Learning locally and scaling up? Presentations**

- Self-reliant Capacity Development for District Health Managers: Harmonization of Technical Assistance and SWAp, A case of Morogoro Health Project, Tanzania – *Dr. Godfrey Mtey, Morogoro Municipal Council; Ms. Erika Fukushi, Chief Advisor, Tanzania-Japan Morogoro Health Project*
- Mozambique’s emerging programme for decentralised planning and finance – *Norbert Eulerling, GTZ*

##### **Working group 2: Getting to joint approaches to CD – and filling the gaps meanwhile?**

###### **Presentations**

- Complementary Approach for Capacity Development in Kenya (Secondary Education) – *Prof. Karega Mutahi, Permanent Secretary, Kenya Ministry of Education; Mr. T. Sugiyama, Chief Advisor, SMASSE Project*
- Joint Approaches to CD in Education in Cambodia – *H.E. Pok Than, Secretary of State, Ministry of Education, Cambodia, and Mr. Mike Ratcliffe, Consultant*

##### **Working group 3: How to design CD as part of design of wider support – and can joint assessment frameworks foster CD?**

###### **Presentations**

- Design of Capacity Development in the World Bank’s

- 2006 portfolio – *Mark Nelson, The World Bank Institute*
- Towards assing country capacity to manage for development results (MfDR) – *Charles Clift, OECD DAC Secretariat*

#### **Working group 4: Pursuing Joint Approaches to CD at the National Level**

##### **Presentations:**

- Joint Approaches to CD – lessons learnt and ways forward in Ghana – *Ms. Helen Allotey; Chief Economic Officer; Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Ghana; Mr. Kristian Lempa; Public Finance Specialist; GTZ Revenue Mobilization Support Ghana*
- Moving towards a new aid architecture for delivering Technical Cooperation in Mozambique – *Alfredo Mazive, consultant, and Simon Vanden Broeke, DFID, Mozambique*

13.00 Lunch break

14.30 **Plenary Session – Presentation of Working Group results**

15.30 **Open Space Session**

18.00 **Plenary Session – Fish Bowl discussion of results**

#### **Wednesday 4 October**

9.00 Report on results of previous day, Nils Boesen

9.15 Report on open space results, Réal Lavergne

9.30 **Introduction into topic 2  
How to assess progress in Capacity and Capacity Development? Introduction by Heather Baser / Doug Horton; ECDPM**


10.00 Break

10.30 **Breakout Session Topic 2: four parallel working groups**

##### **Working group 1: What are we learning from different approaches to monitoring capacity and capacity development?**

##### **Presentations**

- The Benchmark and Assessment Tool for Public Procurement Systems and recent experiences of applying its baseline indicators in Ghana – *AB Adjei, CEO Public Procurement Board of Ghana, Micheal Lawrance, DAC Secretariat*
- Capacity Assessment and Monitoring in CD Support Projects in Solid Waste Management Sector– *Dr. Mitsuo Yoshida, Senior Advisor, Institute for International Cooperation, JICA*
- Informal Approaches to Monitoring Capacity Development– *H.E. Pok Than, Ministry of Education, Cambodia, and Mr. Mike Ratcliffe, Consultant*



**Working group 2: What are we learning from different approaches to evaluating capacity development?**

**Presentations**

- Approaching the intangibles: e-VAL – bringing together different perspectives in evaluation – *Karsten Posse, GTZ*
- Developing and Evaluating Capacity in Research and Development Organisations– *Doug Horton*

**Working group 3: How can we use a soft systems approach to monitor and evaluate capacity?**

**Presentations**

- A balanced approach to measuring capacity – Results, Relations, Visions, Adaption and Self-organisation–*Heather Baser; ECDPM*

**Working group 4. Who should decide what to monitor and evaluate and how to do it?**

**Presentations**

- Tanzania Public Sector Reform – Keeping the agenda in the hands of partner governments – *Dan Kobb, Public Service Management, President's Office, Tanzania*
- Public Financial Management Reform in Mozambique – Differing donor perspectives and their implications for monitoring and evaluation – *Hallgerd Dryssen, Sida*

12.30 Lunch Break

14.00 **Presentations of working group results and Fish Bowl discussion**

15.00 **Introduction into Topic 3: How to strengthen CD through mutual and domestic accountability? Introduction by Thomas Theisohn**

15.30 Break

16.00 **Breakout session Topic 3: four parallel working groups**

**Working group 1: Anchoring mutual accountability in domestic accountability – Civil society perspectives**

**Presentations:**

- Real accountability: improving aid through better accountability; – *Jasmine Burnley, Accountability Group, Action Aid, UK*
- Contributions of human rights frameworks and mechanisms to the promotion of mutual accountability – *Stephan Bartsch, OECD-DAC Secretariat*

**Working group 2: Anchoring mutual accountability in domestic accountability – Between donors and parliament**

**Presentations:**

- Maximising accountability around technical cooperation; - *Tessa McArthur; DFID, UK*

- Working with parliamentarians to improve their capacity to oversee economic policy; the case of South Africa; - *Nhlanhla Nene; Portfolio Committee of Finance South Africa; Neal P. Cohen (USAID)*;

**Working group 3: Flexible approaches to forge mutual accountability: addressing the political economy of aid relations**

**Presentations:**

- Accountable cooperation through Flexible Brokering and Mutual Trust- Transformation Steering Committee in Uganda; - *Godfrey Ssebukulu, Transformation Manager, TSC, Uganda*
- A promising approach to mutual accountability: the Tanzanian experience with the Independent Monitoring Group (IMG), – *Prof. Samuel Wangwe, Tanzania*

**Working group 4: Exploring promising ground to strengthen capacity through accountability**

**Presentations:**

- Capacity for mutual accountability: domestic resource mobilisation. – *Peter Kububea, Michael Otieno; National Tax Payer’s Association, Kenya*
- Accountability and domestic resource revenue mobilisation; - *Ben Dickinson, OECD/DAC secretariat*

17.15

**Topic 3 Fish Bowl Discussion**

**Anchoring mutual accountability in domestic accountability – propositions, promises, limitations**

19.00

Dinner at the “Mampa-Pool-Site” at the Safari Park Hotel

**Thursday 5 October**

9.00

**Open Space Session**

11.15

**Presentation of working group results;**

**Fish Bowl discussion and final plenary session**

12.45

**Closing**

14.30

**LenCD Meeting**

Future Strategy of LenCD

**Open Space Sessions:**

- Donors as catalysts
- CD and enabling environment
- Contributing to local accountability
- Working outside government
- Bringing CD and governance expertise together
- Pooling TA
- Practical ways of operationalising joint approaches

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
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