



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**STUDIES IN
RECONSTRUCTION
AND CAPACITY BUILDING
IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES
IN AFRICA**

**SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM
MOZAMBIQUE, RWANDA,
SIERRA LEONE
& UGANDA**



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**SOME LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM MOZAMBIQUE,
RWANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND UGANDA**

AN ACBF OPERATIONS-BASED STUDY BY

**Prof. Severine Rugumamu, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania &
Dr. Osman Gbla, Fourah Bay University, Sierra Leone**

Revised Report December 2003

PREFACE

The study sought to examine capacity-building experiences from four post-conflict African countries: Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. Liberia was dropped because of logistical problems. The main objective of the study was to draw conclusions and present recommendations that would provide a guide to policies, strategies and instruments for post-conflict capacity-building initiatives by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF). In addition, the study aimed at contributing to an informed dialogue on the Foundation's ability to respond more effectively and efficiently to the needs of societies rebuilding after the conflict. Arguably, the penultimate objective of the study was to consolidate, clarify and refine existing policies, procedures and practices in the post-conflict situations. The study took liberty to extend the mandate of the terms of reference by documenting brief histories of each conflict, and by going beyond the time frames not only to capture development dynamics over a long-term, but also to be able to draw variable lessons from experience for best practices over a relatively longer time span.

The sources of information for this retrospective study were two-fold: extensive reviews of the recent literature on the effectiveness of international intervention in capacity building and structured interviews with officials of government, the private sector and development cooperation organizations. The first phase of the study used secondary sources, which included reviews of books, journal articles and newspapers, official government documents and reports, and the publications of major donor agencies. These reviews analyzed donor and country experiences from various post-conflict countries and highlighted valuable insights and knowledge gaps concerning capacity-building policies, processes and institutions involved in the provision of emergence relief, reconstruction and reconciliation. The second phase of the study used primary sources, mainly in the form of structured interviews and informal conversations and discussions with senior public service personnel, private sector institutions, as well as representatives of the donor community and selected officials of some civil society organizations in Kampala, Kigali, Maputo, Washington, DC, Lagos, and Freetown. Although fully aware of the subjective nature of interviews and the need for caution in processing information obtained, we had a strong conviction that interviews would permit a more nuanced grasp of post-conflict experiences in Africa through the perceptions, frustrations and expectations of a wide variety of actors and stakeholders. A selected list of documents reviewed and personalities interviewed is contained in the references and appendices for each of the four country studies.

Answers were sought on questions such as (i) who assessed the capacity needs? (ii) how and to what extent were national institutions involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of capacity-building programs?; (iii) what were the critical factors that impeded foreign-initiated programs to realize their full potential?; (iv) to what extent were those programs sustainable?; and (v) how and to what extent did national actors assume leadership in articulating real needs, priorities and their respective sequencing?

We would like to thank the Foundation and especially Dr. Gene Ogiogio, Manager, Knowledge Management and Program Support Department (KMPSD) and Dr. Phineas Kadenge also of the KMPSD who directed the study, as well as those individuals who responded to our interview questions and provided us with the information that we requested.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.0 **I**n the realm of peace and security in Africa, the 1990s and beyond witnessed dramatic and profound changes throughout the African Continent. With the end of the Cold War, some of the major tensions between East and West over Africa were markedly eased. South Africa and Namibia installed democratically elected governments. Relative peace and stability was established in Mozambique, after three decades of confrontation between the warring parties. Several dozen African countries held democratic elections. Unquestionably, all these were positive and significant signs of peace, stability and development. However, while many parts of the world moved toward greater stability as well as political and economic cooperation, Africa has remained one of the cauldrons of political instability. In 1999 alone, the Continent witnessed sixteen armed conflicts and more than a thousand people lost their lives in seven battles (Gleditsch, 2002). Political insecurity and violent conflict in Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi were persistent features of the development scene in Africa. Internal strife with deep historical roots surfaced in many countries on the Continent. Ironically, while the international community paid less attention to the African security affairs, the continent's institutional and human capacity to manage its pervasive conflicts also needed commensurate development to cope with reconstruction efforts.

1.1 Ideally, every post-conflict reconstruction effort seeks to respond to the urgent needs of societies emerging from armed conflicts and works to improve the efforts of key actors in rehabilitation and reconstruction operations by identifying and filling gaps within the current capacities of local and international actors. The Report, which synthesizes experiences from Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda, examines why key international development actors and local agents adopted different reconstruction plans and strategies to respond to more or less similar post-conflict situations. It is argued that while strategies obviously inform planning, in practice, planning also helps refine strategies by framing and assessing alternative approaches, identifying differing actor interests and tradeoffs, and by highlighting policy disconnects for decision makers.

1.3 This report, after the introduction, it is divided into five substantive sections. Section two examines the essence of conflict and conflict mapping. Sections three and

four briefly look at the methodology, conceptual framework and the scope of the study. Section five discusses the capacity building environment in Africa. The last section provides a summary of lessons from the four countries.

II. ESSENCE OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MAPPING

(a) Root Causes of Conflict

2.1 Conflict is inherent to all societies. Differences in interests and opinions between groups and countries are natural, but how such differences are expressed and managed determines if conflicts will manifest themselves in primarily political (non-violent) or violent ways. When groups within a society pursue their objectives in accordance with the laws and established norms of that society, conflict tends to be predominantly political.¹ In other cases, however, groups turn to violence to pursue their interests, and the use of violence outweighs the use of political means. A better understanding of what affects the level and dynamics of conflict can ensure that policy interventions do not instigate, exacerbate, or revive situations of violent conflict, but instead, if well designed and implemented, can help reduce conflict.

2.2 Widespread societal conflicts in Africa are often played out against the backdrop of deep poverty, illiteracy and weak systems of governance. Undermined by unfavorable terms of trade, indebtedness and administrative failures, most states in Africa have not responded adequately to the critical social needs of their citizens. The economic and human costs of these conflicts have been extremely high. In the most extreme cases, African insecurity has been reflected in traumatic episodes of collapsed and/or “fragile states”. Almost invariably, state collapses are products of long-term degenerative politics marked by a loss of control over the economic and political space. As would be expected, collapsed states in Africa, as in other parts of the world, have had harmful spillover effects on neighboring countries. The flow of refugees, heightened insecurity and ethnic tensions and the resulting diplomatic conflicts have all engaged substantial resources and efforts from relatively stable countries that share borders with collapsed states (Zartman, 1995:1-5). In the process, what was once thought to be merely domestic conflicts, out of the purview of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), or multilateral agencies like the World Bank, have now taken a center stage. Since 1980, for example, the volume of the World Bank lending to post-conflict countries has increased over 800 percent, to US\$6.2 billion, and touched every region and economic sector (World Bank, 1998:vii).

2.3 The existence of conflict does not, in itself, necessarily lead to the eruption of widespread hostilities. The tolerance and coping capacities of the poor, excluded and marginalized sections of society in Africa are legend and manifold. Conflict does engender large-scale violence if structural conditions are present, such as authoritarian rule and/or lack of political rights, state weaknesses and lack of human and institutional

¹ . In some cases, the state laws themselves promote exclusion, prevent participation, and make groups feel that they have no peaceful, political alternative, and that violence is their only option.

capacity to manage conflict. The risk of an outbreak of violence increases when these conditions exist concurrently or are exacerbated by other problems, such as manipulation of ethnic or other differences (in religion, culture and language), which further fragments society and intensify conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1999; Colletta and Cullen, 2000).

2.4 Every conflict has certain basic elements that permit researchers to produce a tentative road map. The mapper first gathers information about the history of the conflict and its physical and organizational setting. To be sure, a conflict does not emerge in a vacuum. Sometimes one conflict is nested within another. The second stage is to examine the parties to the conflict. These differ in the direction of their involvement, and the importance of its outcome. Primary parties are those who oppose one another, have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict and exhibit fighting behavior. Secondary parties have an indirect stake in the outcome. They are often allies or sympathizers with the primary parties and they serve as mediators, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing forces, or donors that might intervene to facilitate the management of the conflict.

2.5 It is not always possible to distinguish the cause of a conflict from its consequences. In fact, as a conflict emerges, cause and consequences tend to blend. Hostility might be a consequence of one phase of a conflict and a cause of the next. Perceived goal and interest incompatibility is perhaps the most basic cause of social conflict. Identity defense is also common, particularly in the contemporary world where group awareness and rights have assumed high visibility. Cultural differences, and particularly language, are additional sources of separateness and difference. They create a sense of self and self-defense, which is probably another primary motive for conflict. For effective capacity-building interventions, it is important to distinguish clearly the contending goals and interest of each party to the conflict in order to achieve the intended objectives.

2.6 Moreover, a conflict is constantly moving and changing. Even when parties to the conflict are at a stalemate, aspects of a conflict's context will be changing. Runaway responses of parties to one another are made more visible through conflict mapping. Dynamics such as unrestrained escalation and polarization carry participants away from cooperative resolution toward greater hostility. Changes in perception occur within opposing sides, which can reinforce runaway responses: stereotyping opponents, seeing them as the negative mirror image of itself, and imputing to them increasingly malign motives. In this way, a conflict map is able to serve as a conceptual guide to clarify the nature and dynamics of a particular conflict.

2.7 Once conflicts escalate into violence, the major concern of neighboring states, civil society, and the international community is to intervene in order to facilitate the mediation process and help transform structures that produce insecurity and structural violence into positive peace-promoting structures.² We should hasten to point out that

² John Galtung makes a clear distinction between "positive" and "negative" peace. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be. It requires that not only all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. The notion of negative

conflicts in which the state is an effective arbiter do not present particular difficulties since they are manageable within the national framework. The problem arises when the state itself is a party to the conflict; for under those conditions, external involvement becomes necessary. It is argued in this study that a solid foundation establishing peace for development is the creation and nurturing of robust democratic institutions. Institutions are hereby understood as a set of rules governing the actions of individuals and organizations, and encompass the interactions of all relevant parties and negotiations among participants. Specifically, countries as well as societies need institutions that strengthen organizations and promote good governance, whether through laws and regulations, or by coordinating the actions of many players, as in the case of international treaties. Institutions that are internally consistent have the lowest risk of a breakdown because such institutions are self-reinforcing. For post-conflict societies, this means a wide distribution of power and no permanent exclusion of actors from the political system (World Bank, 2000:3).

(b) Costs of Conflict

2.8 During a civil war a society diverts some of its resources from productive activities to destruction. This, according to Paul Collier et al. (2003), causes a double loss: the loss of what the resources were previously contributing and the loss from the damage that they now inflict. The diversion of resources to the war effort often causes a decrease in other public expenditures, such as those on infrastructure, health and education. During the war, and at times immediately after, as was the case in Rwanda and Uganda, the rebel forces tend to target physical infrastructure as part of their strategy. The main targets are the opponent's communications and support lines, e.g. telecommunications, airports, ports, roads and bridges. They looted and destroyed housing, schools and health facilities.

2.9 Moreover, as the study on Mozambique has indicated, the cost of the civil war can be, to say the least, prohibitive. About 40 percent of Mozambican immobile capital in agriculture, communications and administration sectors was destroyed. The pre-war transport system had been one of the largest foreign exchange earners, as goods were transported from and to the neighboring land-locked states of Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In fact, 208 out of 222 units of rolling stock were lost or damaged between 1982 and 1989 (Bruck, 2001).

2.10 Severe conflict, especially its most virulent ethnic forms like those in Mozambique, Rwanda and Sierra Leone destroys much more than buildings and power plants. It short-circuits the rules that keep human interaction constructive and predictable, targets primarily organizations and individuals who administer those rules, and wipes out the most positive forms of social capital. Civil war can have the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there are expectations of honesty to one in which there is expectation of corruption and opportunistic behavior. Once the reputation for honest interaction has been lost, the incentive for honest behavior in the future is greatly

peace is defined as the end of widespread violent conflict associated with war. It may include prevalent social violence and structural violence. For a fine restatement on the subject see Galtung (1995).

weakened and the cost of enforcing transactions increases exponentially. In this sense, therefore, post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building is first and foremost an institutional challenge.³ Failure to meet that challenge dooms the effectiveness of any external facilitation and intervention.

2.11 Probably a substantial cost arises from the fear that violence generates in society. Frightened people tend not only to shift their capital out of the country to environments where the return on investment has not fallen, but more ominously, they tend to flee from their homes. During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for example, the fleeing Rwandan government looted about 24 billion Rwandan francs and substantial amounts of hard currencies from the Central Bank. In addition, an estimated 1 million men, women and children were killed over a three-month period. The genocide also produced about 3 million refugees and 4 million internally displaced persons out of a total Rwandan population estimated at 7.7 million. Moreover, frightened people also tend to lose their valuable assets in the process. Paul Collier et al. (2003:14-16) have noted that less than a fifth of the 1980 cattle stock in Mozambique remained by 1992. Cattle were lost because of direct rebel activity, that is, rebels stole them to feed their troops and killed many others to spread terror, and also due to the indirect effects of warfare, namely, a lack of adequate feed and veterinary attention during the war. Faced with the prospect of such losses, people try to protect their assets by shifting wealth abroad. The Rwandan case has amply demonstrated how the fleeing state official can ransack national coffers.

2.12 The more direct effects of civil war are the fatalities and population displacements. Violent conflict can decimate the human resources of a country as people are killed, maimed, or displaced in large numbers. In the modern civil war, the victims differ from those of the early 20th century wars because the targets have shifted from military personnel to civilians. At the beginning of the 20th century, about 90 percent of the victims were soldiers, but by the 1990s, nearly 90 percent of the casualties resulting from armed conflicts were civilians (Carns, 1997). Forced migration, broadly defined, consists of two groups: refugees and internally displaced persons. The Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) reported in 1997 that it was responsible for the welfare of some 22 million people around the world. Of those, around 13 million people were refugees in the conventional sense of the word: people who have been uprooted by war, violence and violation of human rights throughout the world. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for about 35 percent or 7.8 million of the world's refugees and displaced persons (UNHCR, 1997:2-3).

2.13 Finally, civil wars are not only costly for the countries in which they are fought, but also for the entire regional security complex. Neighboring countries must accommodate large numbers of refugees. Moreover, civil war leads to growing defense budgets in neighboring countries, spreading diseases, drug production and trafficking, and terrorism, as well as tarnishing the reputation of the region in the minds of potential investors.

³ . All post-conflict societies under study were characterized by a generalized collapse of standards in the professions. The rebuilding of standards in the professions: doctors, lawyers, accountants and civil servants is likely to be at the core of restoring social capital in the post-conflict reconstruction process.

II. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Post-conflict reconstruction, like any other development study undertaking, has unique concepts and methodologies that require explanation. The entry point for this work is the World Bank study, *A framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (1997). The study identifies a “country conflict” as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state. In each situation, external agencies need to understand the varying histories and nature of the “failure” process in order to calibrate informed intervention measures to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, support the resumption of economic and social development, and determine at what point in the post-conflict process should a particular country be regarded as having achieved a relative state of normalcy.⁴ These observations are very important precisely because conflicts are different everywhere and require tailor-made approaches. They differ, *inter alia*, in the duration, intensity and scope of destruction, the relative military and political strength of the opponents, and the degree to which the middle and upper classes are affected by the hostilities. Whereas the conflicts in Uganda and Sierra Leone were products of state failure due to predatory or ineffectual governance, the Rwandan state erosion was a product of ethnic-cum-regional conflict and the Mozambican state failure was fueled by ideological conflict.

3.2 Like post-natural disaster reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction typically involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure; it also entails a number of external interventions aimed at rebuilding weakened institutions. The state institutions are usually so weakened that they exhibit little capacity to carry out their traditional functions. Those critical interventions include reviving the economy, reconstructing the framework for democratic governance, rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructure, and planning for financial normalization. In contrast, unlike post-natural disaster construction, post-conflict reconstruction assistance often operates amid social tensions and suspicions between key actors within the country, which can and does influence relations among the involved international parties as well. Moreover, a civil war alters both the level and the structure of economic activity in ways which persist beyond the war. Arguably, “conflict-blind” reconstruction interventions may, at worst, inadvertently exacerbate conflict, and at best, it may simply be irrelevant to the issues that force many of a country’s citizens into a situation of violent conflict (World Bank, 1998a; Rugumamu, 2001).

⁴ . The speed of the evolution toward normalcy and the benchmarks for evaluating progress remain contentious. The World Bank has tentatively proposed that possible indicators should include: (i) macroeconomic stability and its likely sustainability; (ii) recovery of private sector confidence, as measured by the investment ratio; and (iii) the effectiveness with which institutional arrangements and the political system are coping with the tensions, schisms and behaviors that lay behind the conflict to begin with. For details, see World Bank (1998b: 47).

3.3 As other cross-country studies have demonstrated (e.g. El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina) unlike post-disaster reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction interventions are radically different from “normal” operations. The devastation of human, social and physical capital often found at the beginning of the post-conflict period, as well as the particular provisions of the peace agreement, require a paradigm shift when diagnosing and prescribing policy interventions. These should be essentially conflict-mitigating. The volatile and fast-changing circumstances of post-conflict societies demand a high degree of flexibility and speed in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs. In addition, post-conflict interventions tend to have explicit objectives such as supporting the transition from war to peace, resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, and establishing special investment funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment and poverty reduction and decentralization. Moreover, a post-conflict reconstruction process typically requires at least two decades of sustained effort, with the risk of war a recurrent threat (Collier, et al. 2001; World Bank, 1997; Boyce, 1996). Arguably, conflicts are often protracted rather than limited in duration and tend to tear the country’s social fabric and destroy its physical and human capital. Recovery requires incremental planning, careful and realistic policy reforms as well as consideration of the post-war constraints and peace agreements. Raising taxes in post-conflict situations, for example, may discourage private investment. Downsizing the civil service under public sector reform programs, may contradict agreements made under the peace accords. And standard procurement and disbursement procedures can easily degenerate into serious stumbling blocks to recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation. In short, post-conflict operations require intensive monitoring to ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and timely preparation of post-conflict completion reports are required to expedite dissemination of the lessons learned (World Bank, 1998a). A paradigm shift for post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building is therefore proposed.

3.4 It is against this background that most bilateral and multilateral organizations have deliberately established post-conflict research units to consolidate institutional learning on reconstruction issues. Such units can support staff in developing and implementing reconstruction strategies, and act as the focal point for partnerships with other members of the international community.

IV. CAPACITY BUILDING – ISSUES OF FOCUS OF THE STUDIES

4.1 In the four-country studies, we define capacity - including knowledge and technology - as the ability of organizations, individuals and societies to identify constraints and to plan and manage development effectively, efficiently and sustainably. This definition involves both the development of human resources, institutions, and society, and also a supportive policy environment. It encompasses the process by which individuals, groups, organizations and societies develop their abilities individually and collectively, to identify their problems and constraints on development, set development

objectives, formulate policies and programs, perform functions required to solve those problems, and achieve a set of development objectives. Each society has the capacities that correspond to its own functions and objectives. Non-industrial societies, for example, have relatively few formal institutions, but they do have highly developed skills and complex webs of social and cultural relationships that are often difficult for outsiders to comprehend. In short, capacity-building needs should be addressed at three levels: individual, institutional and societal. All these layers of capacity are mutually interdependent. If one or the other is pursued on its own, development becomes skewed and inefficient (Browne, 2002:2-4).

- *Individual:* This involves enabling individuals to embark on a continuous process of learning–building on existing knowledge and skills, and extending these to new directions as fresh opportunities appear.
- *Institutional:* This, too, involves building on existing capacities. Rather than trying to construct new and alien institutions on the basis of foreign blueprints, governments and donors instead need to seek out existing initiatives, however nascent, and encourage these to grow.
- *Societal:* This involves capacities in the society as a whole, or their transformation for development. It encompasses the facilitatory process, which lies at the heart of human development: the opening and widening of opportunities that enable people to use and expand their capacities to the fullest. Social capital and cohesion are at the core of societal capacity and apply both nationally and locally. Without such opportunities, soon people will find that their skills rapidly erode or become obsolete. And if they find no opportunities locally, trained and skilled people will join the brain drain and take their skills overseas.

4.2 In this regard, therefore, the broad concept of capacity building comprises various processes of creating new capacities (capacity creation), effectively mobilizing and utilizing existing capacities (capacity utilization) and sustaining the created capacity over time (capacity retention). These dimensions of capacity development are interactive and dynamic. Briefly, let us elaborate on each of these processes.

5.3 *Capacity Creation:* The creation of effective human and institutional capacity rests on a strong foundation that facilitates the creation of new capacities through learning opportunities, as well as putting in place processes which enhance the adaptability required for dealing with a dynamic environment. Such a foundation is created through formal education and training, and informally through on-the-job training.

5.4 *Capacity Utilization:* Efficient and effective use of existing capacities is an important aspect of capacity building. The failure of most African countries to make effective use of their own human resources has been identified as one of the major factors retarding development. The cause for the underutilization and/or mis-utilization of this critical agent of progress can be traced to the extant disabling environment. In this context, effectiveness and efficiency involve taking stock of existing capacities, and mobilizing them to achieve a set of development goals. Making the best use of existing

capacities will involve tapping all of the creative and innovative energy that can be mobilized from existing human and institutional capacities.

4.5 *Sustaining Capacity*: The capacity that is being created and utilized to realize a set of development goals will need to be retained, developed and sustained over time. Capacity-building programs and projects will need to be designed to be sustainable beyond the initial interventions. Sustaining capacities is more likely to occur in the context of a modicum of political and economic stability that is supportive of conducive working conditions, ensures low risk of violent social conflict, and provides an atmosphere of support for the capacity building efforts in society and promotes democratic governance. Sources of funding to adequately remunerate workers are an important element of sustainability and capacity retention. In the long run, the key to sustaining capacity building programs will be the availability of local sources of funding. Sustainable capacity building will need to address the capacity to mobilize domestic resources, notably government revenues as well as savings and investments. Resource mobilization is therefore an important component of capacity building.

5.6 *Capacity building Environments*: The processes of capacity building are embedded in complex environments that affect their ability to achieve the intended objectives. At the most general level of analysis is the broad political economy environment. This refers to the economic, social and political milieu (local, national and international) in which individuals, organizations and society attempt to carry out their activities, and the extent to which conditions in the environment facilitate or constrain performance. Within this dimension, a broad set of factors affect the ability of actors to perform effectively, efficiently and sustainably. In terms of economic factors, the level and growth rates of GDP, conditions in international commodity and capital markets, the labor market situations, the level of private sector development, and the nature and extent of development assistance all impinge on virtually all activities carried out by government. Politically, actors are affected by factors such as leadership support, the extent to which civil society is mobilized, the degree of political stability, and the nature and development of political institutions. Social factors are also important, e.g. the level of human resource development, tolerance or tensions among social groups; social mobilization and needs; the development of non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and the degree of participation in economic and social life.

4.7 At the international level, it is important to emphasize that donors will have a long-term view of what they want to contribute to – a better health system, efficient judiciary or more skilled economists at the national treasury- in a capacity-building needs matrix. At the same time, however, they remain accountable to their constituencies at home. They feel more comfortable, therefore, if they can point to visible activities such as courses at their home universities, training manuals, computer systems, and such donor needs encourage a bias toward pre-determined projects. Moreover, donors want to retain as much control as possible and avoid accusations that hard-earned taxpayer funds were squandered through inefficiency, incompetence or corruption. One way of achieving this kind of assurance has been to send in expatriates as gatekeepers.

4.8 The second dimension of capacity is the institutional environment of the public sector that facilitates or constrains the actors' activities and affects their performance. This dimension includes: laws and regulations affecting the civil service or private sector and the operation of government, such as hiring, promotion, and remuneration policies; the general operating procedures; and standards of performance. It includes the financial and budgetary support that allows organizations to carry out particular tasks, as well as the policies in effect that constrain or hinder performance. The institutional context also includes laws and regulations defining responsibilities and power relationships among actors and the informal power relationships that often mean some institutions and agencies acquire resources or influence policy more effectively than others. Of course, not all capacity building activities take place through the public sector. All countries are constantly engaged in multiple processes of capacity development, in the public sector, civil society and the private sector.

4.9 The third dimension of capacity building relates to the coordinated activity of multiple organizations that is required to accomplish a given task, i.e., the task network. The interactions of organizations within this network can facilitate or constrain performance. Some organizations may be more central to a given task than others; these are called "primary organizations". Secondary organizations have a less central role in accomplishing the task but are nonetheless essential to it. In addition, there are often supporting organizations that provide important services that enable a task to be performed. How these networks function and the nature of the formal and informal interactions among them are important aspects of organizational performance. Within any particular task network, there may be organizations from diverse levels of government, and from the private sector and NGO sectors.

4.10 The fourth and fifth dimensions of capacity building are the organizational and human resource bases of the organization. These two levels of analysis are closely intertwined. The fourth dimension of capacity building focuses on organizational structures, systems, processes, resources, procedures and management styles that affect how individual talents and skills are used to accomplish particular tasks. It should be pointed out that organizations establish goals, structure work, define authority relations and provide incentives and disincentives that shape the behavior of those who work within them. The fifth dimension of capacity building relates to training and recruitment of managerial, professional, and technical talent that contributes to organizational performance. Among these five sets of factors that affect capacity building initiatives, there may be some that facilitate effective performance and others that constrain it. Case studies research, such as these, can illuminate how various factors have influenced capacity building efforts in post-conflict societies and what interventions can be made to promote better performance in the future.

IV. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND CAPACITY BUILDING: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction support Unit:* The four studies have amply demonstrated that the ability to prevent conflict has less to do with a scarcity of donor resources than with the lack of thorough understanding of the dynamics of conflict, the underlying stakes and appropriate tools to address discord. The reconstruction of war-torn societies has become a sub-specialty within the broader development studies agenda. The special needs of societies emerging from the trauma of conflict have shortened the development planning cycle in a way that demands more flexibility of programs and resources and greater responsiveness to those emergencies heretofore handled only through humanitarian and relief assistance. The need to nurture understanding and develop tools has led to the establishment of specific units within bilateral and multilateral donor agencies to address the development issues of post-conflict societies.⁵ ACBF might consider establishing such a unit that would not only backstop its various interventions with well-informed background studies of countries or regions but also provide expert advice on how best to mainstream conflict prevention and peace-building in all sectors of intervention. An adequately equipped and staffed support unit would be one of the preconditions for successful intervention in post-conflict situations in Africa.

5.2 *Understanding the root causes of conflict:* The four country studies have highlighted the fact that the root causes of conflicts are different in different countries at different times, and that they require tailor-made approaches to bring countries back to a peace and development path. The conflicts in Uganda, Rwanda, Mozambique and Sierra Leone differed, *inter alia*, in their root causes, duration, intensity and scope of the destruction, the relative military and political strengths and resilience of the opponents, and the degree to which the middle and upper classes were affected by the hostilities. In this regard, conflict analysis and conflict impact assessment studies resulting from the future ACBF Post-conflict Support Unit must form an integral part of the entire planning cycle of every individual program and project undertaken by the ACBF. Such studies would most importantly ensure that the Foundation's interventions in post-conflict environments do not unwittingly feed into, instigate or perpetuate old conflicts. The major responsibilities of such a unit would be to undertake conflict mapping of the respective countries by gathering information about the history of each conflict and its physical and organizational setting, about parties to the conflict, and their goals and interests, and by distinguishing the root causes from their consequences. Understanding various histories and their root causes will help to inform reconstruction and capacity-building interventions that are likely to serve as credible and sustainable conflict

⁵ . The following are some of the most robust post-conflict research units: the Peace Building Unit (CIDA); Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands); Division of Humanitarian Assistance (SIDA); Conflict and Human Affairs Department (Department of International Development, UK); Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID); European Community Humanitarian Office, EU); International Committee of the Red Cross, (Red Cross); Interagency Cooperation Unit (WHO); War-torn societies Project (UNRISD); Emergency Response Division (UNDP); Office of Emergency Programs (UNICEF); and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Fund (World Bank).

mitigation measures for societal healing and capacity development. Above all, a deep analysis of conflicts and conflict dynamics should also be seen as a prerequisite for addressing politically sensitive interventions like addressing regional causes of conflicts, arms trafficking, brain drain, demobilization and reinsertion of armed forces, the right use of incentives and sanctions to respond to the regional challenges of insecurity, democratization and the decentralization of government.

5.3 Institutionalized mechanisms for sharing basic information on partner countries: The lack of in-depth knowledge of the historical, political, social and economic context of the conflict in Rwanda has undermined, in many important ways, the effectiveness of regional and international interventions in Rwanda. First, the current study has pointed out how EU member states in Kigali differed in their analyses of the current political landscape of Rwanda and the region. In fact, they tended to be polarized in their views on Rwanda's security concerns and its prolonged presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁶ To be sure, this polarization did help the suffering Rwandans. Second, the four country studies have demonstrated pervasive donor ignorance of African realities. Although, the promotion of reconciliation and peace-building in the four countries was an often-stated aim of most donor programs, there was an obvious lack of technical know-how on how to implement and evaluate such activities in a post-conflict environment. More specifically, some key members of the international community did not immediately recognize the scope and extent of involvement of some political leaders in the Rwandan genocide. It comes as little surprise that some relief agencies used the former leaders to deliver assistance in the refugee camps. This new power enabled the very people who had engineered the genocide to re-establish their command over the refugees. Moreover, not a few human rights observers were totally ignorant of the political history and the social and ethnic structures of Rwandan society. Consequently, they failed to establish any productive rapport with local leaders or local NGOs, which ultimately, proved self-defeating. Thus, the Rwandan experience underscores the need not only for information sharing with indigenous counterparts, but most importantly, and for the ACBF to take a lead role in collecting, collating, analyzing and storing critical data on partner countries and to establish a comprehensive networking arrangement for sharing knowledge, information and best practices with other specialized national, regional and international research networks. That information is power that can hardly be overemphasized.

5.4 The folly of some conventional wisdom: While acknowledging that interventions in post-conflict societies are a special case, most donors in the four country studies seemed to have been more comfortable with planning and undertaking reconstruction projects based on traditional "conventional models" of development rather than undertaking a radical approach that responded to the peculiar exigencies of the moment.

⁶ . At the two ends of the spectrum are France and the United Kingdom, with others falling in-between. Since the genocide, France, which supported the previous ousted regime, has yet to totally resume its structural cooperation with Kigali and is without doubt the most cautious member state. It implements its aid activities directly rather than through government channels. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has developed a close development partnership with the Rwandan government and has pledged long-term development support.

It is perhaps not surprising that most donors organizational cultures and mandates, particularly multilateral agencies seemed to have far more effect on the strategic and operational decisions than concrete situations on the ground. Clumsy and slow procurement procedures, which, while designed for maximum transparency under normal conditions, do not lend themselves to the conditions of post-conflict emergency situations. As the studies have revealed, responding uncritically to the devastation of human, institutional, social and physical capital that occurred in the four countries tended to fly in the face of conventional models of development. Arguably, the delivery of emergency supplies, resettling refugees, and the reconstruction of physical and social capital require flexible and incremental planning, careful and realistic policy reforms, and more critical staff-time than in normal peace-time operations. Standard and complex procurement and disbursement procedures and questionable policy conditionalities tend to exacerbate rather than mitigate the misery and suffering of war-affected populations. Above all, in a world of competing needs and scarce resources, “high profile”, short-term special needs programs, rather than long-term, lower profile and less innovative initiatives like agrarian reform and public sector reform need to be sensitively planned, strategically balanced and prioritized. The former are more popular with donors than recipients, e.g. supporting the judicial process around Gacaca in Rwanda. ACBF might consider investing in enhancing human resource capacities in post-conflict societies by organizing various tailor-made training programs for post-conflict countries at a sub-regional rather than a national level.

5.5 *One of the prerequisites for post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building is for partner governments to establish security and promote international credibility:*

During post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security are essential for sustainable development. Broad-based development, important in its own right, also contributes to sustainable peace. The centrality of the peace objective implies one important corollary: that ACBF must appreciate the political environment and sensitivities of capacity-building interventions. The political environment has two related but distinguishable components: the domestic politics of the post-conflict country; and the explicit or tacit framework adopted by the international community. On the one hand, the secrets behind Mozambique and Uganda’s phenomenal success in their respective political and economic transformations have been the maintenance of internal security (including complete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants) and good rapport with key international actors. Much as reconciliation, human rights, democratization and justice are preoccupations of all donors, due to the political sensitivity of some of these issues, few donors have aggressively trod in such areas. Most programs in those areas have tended to respect the status quo. As the study on Uganda has revealed, few donors have demanded the abandonment of its “no-party democracy” or peaceful negotiations with the rebels in the North. By the same token, one hardly hears any noise from the international community about “power sharing” in Mozambique. At the same time, the less than adequate reconstruction performance in Rwanda can be largely explained by the polarization of donors’ views about the nature and character of Rwanda’s security problems. France and Belgium drastically cut their bilateral assistance to Rwanda, subject to the latter’s compliance with the Lusaka Agreements and UN Resolution No. 1304. In this regards, the Conflict Support Unit would be mandated to

undertake sound political analysis of the perceptions of the key international actors in order to advise ACBF with whom, when and how to enter into strategic partnerships in order to promote coherence, complementarity and coordination in capacity building interventions.

5.6 *A paradigm shift in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity-building policies and strategies:* Capacity building is a means to an end in the long development process. In fact, it is part and parcel of a long development process. It should, by definition, be integrated as fully as possible in national development policies, plans and strategies. In this regard, immediate development goals in any post-conflict reconstruction process must be clearly defined, institutional and human resources development should be mapped out, and a capacity building strategy identified. The key issue for the ACBF would be to assume a leadership role in supporting partner governments and other stakeholders to develop a medium-term, multi-sector capacity-building framework, which would be consistent with their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and their long-term development vision.⁷ The former documents represent the most coherent attempt at generating a domestic consensus on a country's reconstruction agenda. Donors must be encouraged to coordinate their activities around PRSP. Moreover, as was the case in post-conflict Kosovo, the ACBF might consider persuading the Bretton Woods institutions to adopt peace-friendly economic reform programs in Africa, including far-reaching debt relief measures, enhanced quality of foreign aid, and deliberate capacity-building initiatives (including deliberate measures to promote the return of the Diaspora) in support of long-term development efforts and post-conflict recovery. In the same vein, the ACBF might consider persuading the World Trade Organization (WTO) to invoke its "special and differential treatment" trade clause for post-conflict societies.⁸ Above all, ACBF might consider persuading the OECD countries to provide substantive investment guarantees to corporations based in their own home countries that might wish to invest in any post-conflict economies in Africa.

5.7 *Community Participation:* A growing body of evidence points to the linkage between empowerment and development effectiveness both at the society-wide level and at the grassroots level. The arguments to support this observation are disarmingly simple: when citizens are engaged, exercise their voice, and demand accountability, government performance improves and corruption is harder to sustain. Moreover, informed citizen participation can also facilitate in building a strong consensus to support difficult and politically sensitive reforms needed to undertake post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Narayan, 2002:xviii). Briefly stated, participation is a process by which individuals, organizations and communities assume responsibility for their own welfare and that of their community, and develop capacity in order to contribute to their own and their community's development. Active participation of individuals in defining their real

7. In order to harmonize these policy documents, it is important that the conventional economic analysis be supplemented by socio-political analysis so as to identify and broaden a domestic coalition for reform and to build ownership for reconstruction.

⁸ . Beyond exploiting the services of Africans in Diaspora, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati has proposed a "tax on the brain drain", to be levied on highly skilled immigrants working in the North and on receiving countries as a mechanism to support capacity-development in countries in the South. For details see Bhagwati (1983).

needs tends to raise their esteem, mobilize their social energies and help them to shape their social and economic destiny. The four country studies have demonstrated how institutionally weakened post-conflict governments and societies failed to rise to the occasion and effectively participate in matters pertaining to the choice, selection, design and implementation of relief and reconstruction interventions. Under the pretext of weak recipient governments, donors tended to impose politically visible projects (often with negligible immediate or long-term impact on the war victims) and also created dozens of project management units parallel to existing government structures.⁹ Our respondents in Rwanda reported that the government constantly expressed its dismay at the lack of aid being channeled directly through its institutions. Instead of promoting and strengthening the newly created aid coordination instrument, CEPEx, donors were regularly and imprudently bypassing it. It is important to remember that, ultimately, the test of the effectiveness of international cooperation ultimately centers on the extent to which donors successfully promote increased self-reliance in partner countries. ACBF might consider joining with progressive forces within the international community that genuinely seek to build, empower and strengthen capacities in post-African conflict societies by putting its partners at the center of the decision-making process.

5.8 ***Donor coordination and long-term commitment:*** The four-country studies have found that effective and efficient coordination or lack of it makes a huge difference in post-conflict reconstruction and capacity building. Due to the massive, urgent needs of immediate post-conflict situations together with the presence of many donors eager to provide support (each with its own agenda), there is an imperative for effective and efficient donor coordination. Whereas it is true that fragile states lack the requisite capacity even of articulating their pressing needs, this should not provide an excuse for bypassing existing government structures and creating separate exogenous project coordination units (PCU). These studies have clearly shown that where donor coordination and joint approach were instituted such as those by the World Bank in Uganda, the United Nations Observation Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), post-conflict reconstruction and capacity-building interventions had impressive results. These three lead organizations coordinated and integrated damage and needs assessments, and allowed integrated planning as well as resource mobilization and utilization. The current country studies have also demonstrated that in the absence of effective donor coordination such as in Rwanda the opposite was true. Competing donor bureaucracies worked at cross-purposes, as some of them either deliberately bypassed designated government institutions or imposed onerous conditionalities or even both. Our interviewees expressed a preference for either the World Bank or the European Union to exercise a leadership role in post-conflict reconstruction and to commit long-term quality resources to capacity building. Some of the benefits accruing from a proactive leadership role by the Bank or the Union

⁹ . The World Bank experience is instructive on this point. In one of its studies, it concluded that “without government participation from the early stages...the project is unlikely to reflect the priorities of the government. At the implementation stage, the program will be resented and rendered ineffective, regardless of the quality of its design, delivery or supervision”. Buyck, B. *Technical Assistance as a Delivery Mechanism for Institutional Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.1989: 22.

include the quality of their analytical and advisory services, their relationships with other donors, their access to the IMF, and their potential to mobilize funds from other sources.

5.9 ACBF to participate in multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) in order to undertake post-conflict institution development and capacity-building: If ACBF assumes a lead role in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction in Africa, it might consider participating in future peace negotiations in order to provide capacity-building advice, post-conflict capacity-building planning and coordination, creation of an endowment fund by respective national governments for capacity creation, co-financing of operations, joint undertaking of human resource and institutional capacity audits in order to identify inadequacies and obstacles to capacity-building (use, retention and continuous upgrading of capacities), and together with respective beneficiary partners (government, academia, private sector and civil society), define their respective capacity needs, priorities and sequencing. At the same time, ACBF might also consider participating and, where possible, coordinating multi-donor trust funds (MDTF) for capacity-building initiatives in post-conflict situations in Africa. To be sure, it is unlikely that ACBF will independently initiate major capacity-building operations in countries with major complex emergencies in the near future. A MDFT program would require an agreed-upon program of capacity-building activities, ownership by partner government and major potential donors; workable interfacing with local aid management agencies; and the fullest possible transparency and openings for citizens' voices. In this regard, close cooperation and strategic networking with the European Union, UNDP and the World Bank would be crucial in avoiding initiative duplication and ensure that all effort made are both compatible and mutually reinforcing. ACBF might also consider joining the UNEDIL program, developed by UNDP, the then Economic Development Institute (EDI) and the ILO, and financially supported by UNDP and some bilateral donors to build indigenous competencies in the sixteen African management institutes and three regional organizations to avoid the traditional reliance on foreign training and expatriates.

5.10 Promote the adoption of an explicit national capacity-building policy framework: Capacity building should be defined and interpreted in broader national development goals and objectives. These four studies have demonstrated that donor-supported capacity-building initiatives tend to be designed and implemented in isolation, without being guided by an explicit national policy framework or strategy. In war-torn countries where the human needs are overwhelming, the duplication of donor efforts is, to say the least, scandalous. Worse still, the immediate post-conflict capacity-building projects in the four countries were not coordinated at multiple levels: within ministries and between governments and donors. This situation was further compounded by a weak information flow on capacity gaps, and limited horizontal and vertical linkages among institutions which were supposed to collaborate and coordinate similar tasks. ACBF might consider supporting institutionally weakened post-conflict partner governments to develop multi-sector capacity-building policy frameworks that can address real institutional and human capacity needs and priorities both from the supply-side (e.g. training of suitably qualified nationals) and from the demand-side including human resource planning, appropriate pay, incentives and retention within the public sector

before any major intervention.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, this would be an imaginative policy conditionality for future support.

5.11 *Building and strengthening capacities of critical national institutions:*

According to most of our interviewees, the capacity of the four post-conflict societies to absorb aid effectively was, and continues to be limited by the lack of appropriately qualified staff and effectively functioning institutions. Building and retaining human resource capacity across the board is one of the most difficult challenges facing post-conflict governments and their development partners. Human resource management capacity needs to be built within the government, civil society, and the private sector if development activities are to be implemented effectively. As the four case studies have amply demonstrated, the most common response from development partners has been to provide targeted key ministries with short-term, highly expensive foreign technical assistants and consultants to undertake routine bureaucratic functions. We have argued that such interventions should only be viewed as a temporary, gap filling emergency measure. They have to be reconciled with, and made complementary to longer-term institutional development needs. In post-conflict environments, actors and stakeholders from across the spectrum are agreed that there is no substitute for a comprehensive civil service reform to restore public sector management capabilities. Critical reforms include systems of governance, administrative culture, size and cost of the civil service, the pay structure and other incentives. The ACBF might consider taking a leadership role by addressing the special needs of post-conflict capacity situations, underscoring the need for greater comprehensiveness and sustainability of critical programs to be initiated and supported. For example, unlike other donors, the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) adopted an innovative sector-wide approach to Rwandan long-term capacity building needs, rather than a mere provision of foreign technical assistants.¹¹ The four studies emphasized that in post-conflict situations, education can also be one of the most critical and strategic instruments toward peace and reconciliation. The history of the misuse of schools to channel intolerance and ethnic violence in Rwanda is only too vivid.

5.12 *Restoring and strengthening social capital:* Relatively better funded post-conflict reconstruction projects in Rwanda, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Uganda tended to focus more on rebuilding the infrastructure than on restoring and reconstructing institutions and the social fabric of society. The brutal nature and the extent of the conflict, along with the ensuing mass migration, profoundly damaged the social

¹⁰ . As a consequence of conflicts and severe economic crises, the four post-conflict countries in our study have been confronted with a dramatic erosion of public sector wages below levels that can either sustain employees above the poverty line or attract and retain highly qualified personnel. The net result has been brain drain, inefficiency, moonlighting, widespread demoralization and corruption. The four country studies propose that addressing public sector wages and benefits should be brought to the center stage of every national capacity-building initiative.

¹¹ . In close collaboration with the Ministry of Education and the World Bank, DFID adopted a long-term comprehensive sector-wide approach for the rehabilitation and development of the education sector in Rwanda. DFID earmarked 21 million pounds in direct budgetary support (primarily for teachers' salaries) and 13 million Pounds in technical assistance within the Ministry of Education for three years. The strategy includes all sectors of education in Rwanda.

foundations of these societies. Moreover, war has militarized these societies, disrupted existing social organizations and created others. While the severity of this problem in post-conflict societies is increasingly recognized, neither the World Bank nor other bilateral aid organizations has an obvious comparative advantage in this area. ACBF might consider assuming a leadership role on this issue, by integrating it into its current briefs on democratic governance and civil society. The Foundation's entry point would be to support baseline studies to assess the impact of war on vulnerable groups such as children, women and the elderly, and to train teachers who would recognize the symptoms of stress, anxiety, trauma and depression. Studies on women, for example, would seek to identify men and women's differing vulnerabilities to violent conflict, as well as their different capacities and coping strategies. In addition, they would be able to identify unequal power relationships underlying various social organizations in order to ensure that women are not further marginalized by donor-supported reconstruction interventions.

5.13 *Deliberate policies to reduce social and economic inequalities:* An equally profound challenge to reconciliation and reconstruction is for post-conflict societies to be supported in designing and implementing policies and programs that seek to address the root causes of the conflict. The four studies have shown that social inequalities, whether ethnic, regional religious or class-based, share in fuelling conflict in the first place. While country-specific PRSPs clearly set out the relationships between poverty and long-term structural issues, neither donors nor national governments in post-conflict countries have followed the PRSP to the letter. Moreover, although subsistence agrarian economies characterize the vast majority of the labor in the four countries under study, large-scale agricultural reforms which would require significant changes in cultural practices as well as land rights hardly get the attention that they require from national governments or the international community. ACBF might wish to invest in post-conflict capacity-building programs which seek to empower the poor through adequate participation in the choice and design of programs as well as targeting them for specific training opportunities that are likely to lead to the creation of enduring physical and human assets.

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